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SE(c)(3): A Catalyst for Social Enterprise Crowdfunding
DANA BRAKMAN REISER* & STEVEN A. DEAN**
The emerging consensus among scholars rejects the notion of tax breaks for social
enterprises, concluding that such prizes will attract strategic claimants, ultimately
doing more harm than good. The SE(c)(3) regime proposed by this Article offers
entrepreneurs and investors committed to combining financial returns and social
good with a means of broadcasting that shared resolve. Combining a measured tax
benefit for mission-driven activities with a heightened burden on shareholder
financial gains, the revenue-neutral SE(c)(3) regime would provide investors and
funding platforms with a low-cost means of screening out “greenwashed” ventures.
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INTRODUCTION
Social enterprises—entities that use business strategies to advance both profit and
social goals—suffer from a capital-access problem.1 Scholars have responded to the

† Copyright © 2015 Dana Brakman Reiser & Steven A. Dean.
* Vice Dean and Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
** Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
‡ This Article benefited from thoughtful comments from Brian Galle and the
participants in the 2013 Law & Society Association’s Annual Meeting, the NYU-Stern
Conference on Social Entrepreneurship, the Managing Social Enterprise seminar at the Yale
School of Management, the Tax Justice & Human Rights Symposium at the McGill University
School of Law, the 2013 Conference of the Association for Research on Nonprofit
Organizations and Voluntary Action, the Tulane Tax Roundtable, and the Current Issues in
Tax Law, Policy and Practice seminar at Harvard Law School.
1. Neil Parmar, No Case for Causes: Social Enterprises Have a Hard Time Landing
Capital, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2014, at R3 (noting that as social enterprises “try to scale up,
they’re having a tough time landing investment capital to fund their growth, experts and
entrepreneurs say”).
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suggestion that tax breaks could ease that logjam2 with a resounding “no.”3 This
Article offers a more nuanced answer, pairing a carrot with a stick to create a
revenue-neutral4 SE(c)(3) tax regime that rewards commitment to a double bottom
line and provides a bulwark against faithlessness.5
The obstacles social enterprises face when raising capital are straightforward.
Soliciting donations is difficult without the tax-deductibility incentive charities can
offer.6 Purely market-driven investors will reject social enterprise investments on just
the whiff of potentially below-market returns. Even investors keen on earning a blend
of financial and social returns will be wary.7 That reluctance reflects the simple reality
that when founders or entrepreneurs hold the reins of a social enterprise, they have the
power to choose its path. Should they choose to forgo social good in order to maximize
profits, passive investors on the retail level will be powerless to stop them.
The wave of hybrid organizational forms for social enterprise that has gained
momentum in recent years has only managed to invert—rather than resolve—that
threat.8 Corporate hybrids, like the benefit corporation and Delaware public-benefit
corporation, grant shareholders the power to embrace pure profit maximization.9 As
a result, dominant shareholders can transform these specialized entities into ordinary
for-profit corporations. They can do so even if founders or dispersed shareholders
object. More broadly, these hybrid entities lack both the organizational commitments

2. See generally Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for For-Profit Charities, 93
VA. L. REV. 2017 (2007) (proposing tax-exempt treatment for the mission-driven activities of
for-profit corporations).
3. See generally Victor Fleischer, “For-Profit Charity”: Not Quite Ready for Prime
Time, 93 VA. L. REV. BRIEF 231 (2008); Mitchell A. Kane, Decoupling?, 93 VA. L. REV. BRIEF
235 (2008); Benjamin Moses Leff, The Case Against For-Profit Charity, 42 SETON HALL L.
REV. 819 (2012); Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer & Joseph R. Ganahl, Taxing Social Enterprise, 66
STAN. L. REV. 387 (2014).
4. “Revenue neutral” refers to the impact of the regime on the federal budget. A tax
break is not revenue neutral because it decreases revenues. A tax change can also increase
revenues. Because the SE(c)(3) regime combines a tax penalty with a tax break, it can be
revenue neutral in the aggregate even if particular enterprises fare better or worse than they
would otherwise. See infra notes 109–11 and accompanying text.
5. As discussed below, the regime need not direct public resources to the social enterprise
sector. Individual corporations may fare better (if they prioritize their mission) or worse (if they
focus exclusively on shareholder financial rewards) than they otherwise would, but the regime is
primarily a mechanism for attracting private capital by demonstrating a commitment to balancing
social goals and private rewards. See infra Part III.
6. Traditional nonprofits face a similar obstacle when potential donors do not itemize
their deductions and are thus unable to capitalize on the deductibility of contributions. See
I.R.C. § 67(b) (2012) (treating charitable deductions as itemized deductions not subject to
unfavorable “miscellaneous” treatment).
7. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
8. The first entity tailored to meet the needs of social enterprise, the low-profit limited
liability corporation (L3C), leaves entrepreneurs in the driver’s seat. They may shed an L3C’s
special status and become an ordinary limited liability company (LLC) simply by changing
their activities. See Dana Brakman Reiser & Steven A. Dean, Hunting Stag with Fly Paper: A
Hybrid Financial Instrument for Social Enterprise, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1495, 1498 (2013).
9. Id. at 1506–13.
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and enforcement mechanisms necessary to attract investors worried that the social
commitments of entrepreneurs, or their fellow investors, will fade.
Sophisticated investors wielding significant capital, of course, need not rely on
newfangled organizational forms to protect themselves. These savvy investors can
instead use specialized financial instruments to overcome the trust issues inherent in
double-bottom-line ventures.10 Convertible debt, preferred stock, and other
arrangements can be designed to incentivize entrepreneurs and fellow investors to
stay on mission and to cabin the financial benefit of straying. “Mom-and-pop”
investors, however, do not have the experience to develop specialized instruments or
the sway to deploy them. If the social enterprise sector wants to reach the vast market
of retail investors (and their capital), it must find a way to reassure these investors
effectively and en masse.
The advent of crowdfunding—conceived as a means of pooling small amounts of
capital to fund artistic, philanthropic, and business ventures11—throws this challenge
and opportunity into stark relief. Crowdfunding offers social enterprises a means to
access the retail-investor market more cheaply and readily than ever before.12 But
crowdfunding, with its promise of bypassing Wall Street to raise capital directly from
Main Street, relies on a large class of investors with neither access nor influence;
crowdfunding a social enterprise would invite the very type of faithlessness that
keeps small investors at bay. Neither hybrid organizational forms nor hybrid
financial instruments can provide a counterweight to profit’s pull since in each case
an outsider’s power remains proportional to the size of his investment.13 To
successfully attract crowdfunding, insiders need a means of signaling a commitment
to balancing social and financial returns.
This Article proposes a robust mechanism that would allow both insiders and
outsiders to demonstrate their commitments to social mission. Rather than relying on
organizational form to shield an enterprise’s social mission, this Article crafts a tax
regime designed to comfortably accommodate a double bottom line while inflicting
pain on investors interested only in financial returns. The proposed regime taps the
power of the tax law14 to unlock the potential of innovative funding platforms capable
of channeling capital toward social enterprise.15

10. See infra note 92 and accompanying text.
11. As in the Capital Raising Online While Deterring Fraud and Unethical
Non-Disclosure Act of 2012 (the CROWDFUND Act), crowdfunding refers to the use of
online tools to raise capital through the aggregation of many small investments. JOBS Act,
Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306, 315 (2012).
12. See Parmar, supra note 1 (noting that crowdfunding is an “increasingly popular
solution” for social enterprises seeking capital).
13. A supermajority of shareholders can decide to convert a hybrid corporation to a
for-profit corporation. This supermajority requirement would not allow a small shareholder to
prevent a conversion. Likewise, the owner of a handful of convertible debt would not, on her
own, be able to inflict much punishment on a wayward shareholder. See infra note 92 and
accompanying text.
14. The proposal relies on federal tax law, but most of the legislation encouraging social
enterprise has been enacted at the state level. Although the national reach of the proposal is
one of its virtues, state legislators could use state tax law to achieve similar ends.
15. Crowdfunding enthusiasts claim it allows small investors and small, often socially
minded businesses to connect to create value. See Michal Lev-Ram & Kurt Wagner,
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The core of the regime is straightforward: the first $250,000 of profit attributable
to any for-profit corporation’s 501(c)(3) activities goes untaxed each year.16 An
additional dollar-for-dollar—or in the vernacular of social enterprise, one-for-one—
exclusion applies for each dollar of such income earned. The remainder of the
corporation’s income would be subject to the corporate income tax. The $500,000
annual exclusion limit on a corporate social enterprise (or SE(c)(3)) is both generous
enough to accommodate the modest profit objectives of a typical social enterprise
and small enough to ensure that it will not swallow the whole of the corporate tax.
The SE(c)(3) exclusion represents only one aspect of the regime. The iron fist inside
the exclusion’s velvet glove is ordinary income treatment for dividends paid by any
corporation that has embraced SE(c)(3) status.17 The same result applies to gains from
the sale of SE(c)(3) stock. The relatively high tax burden on those financial returns
transforms a simple subsidy into what is known as a “commitment device.”18
As a drinker determined not to drive might hand his keys to a policeman, the
SE(c)(3) regime allows entrepreneurs and investors devoted to social enterprise to

Crowdfunding Tries To Grow Up, FORTUNE, May 20, 2013, at 40, 40 (“Proponents of
crowdfunding believe it has the potential to upend traditional financing models, such as loans
and venture capital, and unleash a tidal wave of capital for entrepreneurs, creative types, and,
yes, cheesemongers. Reliable estimates of the industry’s size are hard to come by, but one
research outlet, Massolution, predicts some $5 billion will be raised through crowdfunding
this year, up from $2.7 billion in 2012.”). If SE(c)(3) status was made available, crowdfunding
sites could use it as a screen for participating issuers, dramatically lowering their costs of vetting
potential participants. The availability of SE(c)(3) status would tame one potent impediment to
capital access for social enterprises for even the most vulnerable. See infra Part III.
16. The regime uses mission-driven expenditures as a rough measure of mission-driven
income. See infra Part III.A.3.
17. The tax law offers a lower tax rate for taxpayer’s capital gains. See I.R.C. § 1(h)
(2012). In order to qualify for that treatment, the property sold at a gain must be a “capital
asset.” See I.R.C. § 1221 (2012) (listing property that is excluded from the preferred category).
Adding SE(c)(3) shares to that list—alongside inventory, copyright in the hands of its creator,
and an assortment of other types of properties deemed ineligible for capital-gain treatment—
would subject gains on sales of SE(c)(3) shares to the relatively high rates that apply to, for
example, wages. Id. at (a)(1), (3) (excluding “stock in trade of the taxpayer” and “a copyright
. . . held by . . . a taxpayer whose personal efforts created such property” from the definition
of a “capital asset”). Broadening the exclusion to cover financial instruments whose value is
largely determined by or can be converted into SE(c)(3) shares would prevent end-runs around
the exclusion. Excluding SE(c)(3) stock from § 1221 would, of course, cause losses to be
treated as ordinary losses, a result that taxpayers generally prefer. A less generous approach
would strip gains of preferential rates while denying ordinary treatment for losses.
18. Tax laws have long played a pivotal role in promoting both charitable and for-profit
ventures. Usually, that assistance comes in the form of tax subsidies. See Henry B. Hansmann,
The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 881–84 (1980) (offering examples of the
“special treatment under state and federal taxation” that subsidizes nonprofits). The SE(c)(3)
exclusion would leverage the tax law to aid social enterprises, but not principally through its
offer of modest tax relief. The more valuable function of the exclusion would be to provide
small investors the reliable signal they need to sort double-bottom-line entities from
“greenwashed” for-profit ventures that insincerely boast a commitment to a social mission but
in reality focus only on profits.
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enlist an unlikely ally to their cause: the Internal Revenue Service.19 A strategic
SE(c)(3) claimant would need to weigh the certainty of a heavy tax burden on stock
sales and profit distributions against the possibility of a modest exclusion available
only for mission-driven income. By contrast, the SE(c)(3) regime’s combination of
favorable treatment for SE(c)(3) income paired with unfavorable treatment for
shareholder financial returns would hold great appeal for entrepreneurs and investors
dedicated to pursuing a double bottom line. Best of all, SE(c)(3) status would send a
credible signal to small investors, on crowdfunding platforms and elsewhere, that an
electing social enterprise is worth their trust.
I. SOCIAL ENTERPRISE AND CROWDFUNDING
Human-interest stories about businesses with a social mission abound. Food
purveyors are training hard-to-employ workers,20 inventors are developing ideas for
a low-cost light source or water filter to transform communities in developing
countries,21 and an ever-increasing range of consumer products are offered on a
one-for-one model.22 At the same time, investors at all levels display a growing
interest in deploying their capital in a socially conscious fashion, and every day more
people are eating at crowdfunded restaurants, watching crowdfunded movies, or
sporting their latest crowdfunded knickknack. The 2012 JOBS Act included a
regulatory structure to enable equity crowdfunding as part of its effort “[t]o increase
American job creation and economic growth by improving access to the public
capital markets for emerging growth companies.”23
Still, social enterprises generally remain quite small and complain of a desperate
need for capital. The catalyst this Article proposes to channel private capital—
particularly small investments by ordinary individuals—toward double-bottom-line
enterprises consists of a combination of penalties and rewards. Specifically, the
SE(c)(3) tax regime provides a tax break targeted at the 501(c)(3) activities of

19. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
20. See, e.g., Marilyn Jones, Andrew Stoloff's Rubicon Bakery Gives a Second Chance to
Ex-Cons, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Mar. 14, 2014), http://www.csmonitor.com
/World/Making-a-difference/2014/0314/Andrew-Stoloff-s-Rubicon-Bakery-gives-a-second
-chance-to-ex-cons (“Rubicon Bakery is a moneymaking business owned by Mr. Stoloff,
employing 105 full-time staff, some with only a sixth-grade education and many having served
time in prison.”).
21. See, e.g., Paula Goldman, Impact Investing: Harnessing The Power of Business for Social
Good, GUARDIAN (Dec. 2, 2013, 7:25 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/global-development
-professionals-network/2013/dec/02/impact-investing-business-charity-social-good?CMP=twt
_gu (highlighting “d.light—a leading US manufacturer and distributor of solar lanterns . . . [which
has] transform[ed] itself from a small-scale operation to a thriving global enterprise”); A.R., Social
Entrepreneurs in India: Water for All, ECONOMIST (Mar. 20, 2013, 10:25 AM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2013/03/social-entrepreneurs-india (profiling Sarvajal,
a social enterprise that “sells clean drinking water to more than 70,000 people in rural India”).
22. See Andrew Adam Newman, ‘Buy One, Give One’ Spirit Imbues an Online Store,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2013, at B7 (describing a number of one-for-one businesses, including
TOMS Shoes and One World Futbol).
23. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306, 306 (2012).
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for-profit corporations24 while withdrawing favorable capital-gain treatment from
profits earned by shareholders of SE(c)(3)s.25 By choosing the SE(c)(3) regime, a
social enterprise publicly and irrevocably declares its commitment to balancing
profits and social good.26 This Part sets the stage for that proposal by introducing the
notion of a dual-mission enterprise and explaining why the advent of JOBS Act–
enabled equity crowdfunding will not suffice to unleash the retail-investment market
to capitalize social enterprise.
A. The Puzzle of the For-Profit Charity
The idea of a social enterprise—a business entity with social and profit-making
goals and a concomitantly double bottom line—strikes some as pure madness.27 To
its devotees and advocates, however, social enterprise offers the best of both worlds.
Rather than leaving the community and the environment in its wake like full-throttle
profit-maximizing capitalism, a successful social enterprise can turn a modest profit
while doing good for society.28 Moreover, instead of using small-time, inefficient,
charitable techniques, successful social enterprises can use the innovation and
discipline of business methods to solve social problems at scale.29
The trend to try to combine financial and social returns appears to be gaining
steam. Prominent business schools have established social enterprise programs. They
offer specialized curricula for interested students, research support for faculty, and
networking opportunities for alumni.30 Media accounts chronicle the entry of newly

24. The SE(c)(3) regime measures the cost a social enterprise’s mission imposes and—
up to a $250,000 annual limit—provides an exclusion equal to that cost. It augments that
exclusion with an additional $250,000 one-for-one exclusion. The end result is that a social
enterprise can “earn” a tax break by engaging in the activities that might otherwise be
conducted by a traditional 501(c)(3) nonprofit. See infra Part III.B.
25. Ordinarily when an investor sells shares of a corporation, any gains are taxed at a
lower rate than the investor would pay on an equal amount of salary. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(1)
(2012) (providing a special, lower tax rate applicable to income such as gains from stock sales
that results in “net capital gain”). Corporate dividends are generally granted the same favorable
treatment. See I.R.C. § 1(h)(11) (2012).
26. Part II explains the concept of the commitment device and how the SE(c)(3) regime
permits investors and entrepreneurs to limit their future freedom of action in a manner that
serves a larger goal. Simply put, the SE(c)(3) regime lowers the cost of pursuing social good
and increases the costs of focusing on financial gain. See infra Part II.
27. Puzzling over the combination, Kane was reminded of a museum exhibit titled Mythic
Creatures: Dragons, Unicorns and Mermaids. Kane, supra note 3, at 241.
28. See Heerad Sabeti, The For-Benefit Enterprise, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov. 2011, at 99,
104 (concluding that “[i]t will become clear that in organizing their enterprises for benefit,
entrepreneurs have been the architects of a new, more sustainable capitalism”).
29. See, e.g., J. Gregory Dees & Beth Battle Anderson, For-Profit Social Ventures, 2
INT’L J. ENTREPRENEURSHIP EDUC. (SOC. ENTREPRENEURSHIP) 1, 5 (2003) (“Many social
entrepreneurs believe that for-profit structures have virtues that are not easily mimicked by
nonprofit or public sector counterparts.”); Thomas Kelley, Law and Choice of Entity on the
Social Enterprise Frontier, 84 TUL. L. REV. 337, 339 (2009) (explaining that social enterprise
founders “embrace market-oriented solutions to social ills”).
30. See, e.g., About, HARV. BUS. SCH. SOC. ENTERPRISE, http://www.hbs.edu/socialenterprise
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minted graduates of such programs into the social enterprise field, as well as their
early successes.31 The number of conferences dedicated to social enterprise continues
to increase, including a number of annual meetings designed to convene social
entrepreneurs, thought leaders in the space, and even funders.32 The same is true of
more scholarly meetings.33 Media interest is high,34 and even government entities
have begun to get involved.35
Despite this enthusiasm, most social enterprises are small, and many are startups.36
These mission-driven businesses need funding to develop, whether they are working to
demonstrate proof-of-concept or to bring a small success to scale.37 Fortunately, social
entrepreneurs are not the only group interested in marrying social good with profit.

/about/; The Tamer Center for Social Enterprise, COLUM. BUS. SCH., http://www8.gsb.columbia.edu
/socialenterprise/; see also Katie Smith Milway & Christine Driscoll Goulay, The Rise of Social
Entrepreneurship in B-Schools in Three Charts, HBR.ORG (Feb. 28, 2013), http://blogs.hbr.org
/2013/02/the-rise-of-social-entrepreneu/.
31. E.g., Delece Smith-Barrow, Make Money in Social Enterprise with a Business School
Degree, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (May 29, 2013, 9:30 AM), http://www.usnews.com
/education/best-graduate-schools/top-business-schools/articles/2013/05/29/make-money-in
-social-enterprise-with-a-business-school-degree.
32. E.g., SOC. ENTERPRISE ALLIANCE, CONFERENCE GUIDE (2014), available at
http://summit14.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/04/SEA_2014_SummitProgGuide_web.pdf;
2013 Fall Conference, SOC. VENTURE NETWORK, http://svn.org/attend-an-event/2013-fall
-conference; Selection in Progress: Good Deals Social Pitch Contest, SOC. ENTERPRISE
WORLD F., http://www.socialenterpriseworldforum.org/gooddealssocialpitchcontest/; SOC.
ENTERPRISE CROWDFUNDING CONF., http://secfc.tumblr.com/; see also CSR Events, CORP.
SOC. RESP. NEWSWIRE, http://www.csrwire.com/events (providing a nationwide, day-by-day
list of events addressing social enterprise and corporate social responsibility).
33. E.g., 2014 Social Enterprise Conference, COLUM. BUS. SCH., http://
www.columbiasocialenterprise.org/conference/; Crowdfunding and Its Implications for the
Entrepreneurial Ecosystem: Setting the Research Agenda, LEEDS SCH. OF BUS., U. COLO.
BOULDER, http://crowdfundconference.org/program-and-schedules/ (offering an academic
panel devoted entirely to social enterprise issues); Schedule, SOC. ENTERPRISE CONF.,
http://socialenterpriseconference.org/ (describing an annual program copresented by students
of the Harvard Business School and the Harvard Kennedy School of Government).
34. See, e.g., Anne Field, One-Stop Incubators Hatching Social Enterprise Startups,
FORBES.COM (Apr. 20, 2012, 10:57 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/annefield/2012/04/20
/one-stop-incubators-hatching-social-enterprise-startups/; Tim Smedley, Social Enterprises Aid
Innovation in Education, GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2013, 3:00 AM), http://www.theguardian.com
/social-enterprise-network/2013/aug/02/social-enterprise-aids-education-innovation.
35. Chi Onwurah, Lessons from Portugal: Social Enterprises and Economic
Regeneration, GUARDIAN (Aug. 5, 2013, 10:40 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/social
-enterprise-network/2013/aug/05/social-enterprises-aid-economic-regeneration.
36. Keren G. Raz, Toward an Improved Legal Form for Social Enterprise, 36 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 283, 294 (2012) (“Once a social enterprise establishes itself, if it is
successful as a business, the revenue it generates will cover its costs. The challenge, therefore,
lies in financing its startup and growth phases.”).
37. See John Walker, A Financing Gap, ECHOING GREEN (Jan. 20, 2011, 4:36 PM),
http://www.echoinggreen.org/blog/financing-gap (describing social enterprises as falling into
a “financing gap” between large institutional funding sources and smaller funding sources).
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The community of sophisticated investors looking for social impact is large and
growing.38 JPMorgan identified 2200 impact investment transactions worth more
than $4 billion in its recent study of the phenomenon.39 Other studies share this
optimism.40 Indeed, our own prior work has suggested an important place for such
impact investors in capitalizing social enterprises.41 These investors have the ability,
resources, and clout to demand or design specialized financial products to safeguard
both their financial and their social goals.
Retail investors also desire investment vehicles that combine financial return and
the “warm glow” of doing good (or at least avoiding evil).42 These mom-and-pop
investors cannot afford or even imagine bespoke financial instruments to protect their
interests in social enterprise investment, however. To reach their shallow but
numerous pockets, another approach is required. The obvious candidates are mutual
funds and pension funds.
The socially responsible mutual fund category is large and growing, with
investments into them rising every year.43 The Forum for Sustainable and

38. Q&A Roundtable on Impact Investing Moderated by Johanna Mair & Katherine
Milligan, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Winter 2012, at 25, 25 (“The field of impact investing
is attracting growing numbers of organizations and increasing amounts of money. By some
estimates there are nearly 200 registered impact investment funds, and many foundations (such
as Rockefeller), networks (like GIIN and ANDE), and mainstream financial institutions
(including JPMorgan Chase) are active in the field.”).
39. YASEMIN SALTUK, AMIT BOURI & GISELLE LEUNG, J.P. MORGAN, INSIGHT INTO THE
IMPACT INVESTMENT MARKET 3 (2011), available at http://www.jpmorganchase.com
/corporate/socialfinance/document/Insight_into_the_Impact_Investment_Market.pdf.
See
generally MONITOR INST., INVESTING FOR SOCIAL & ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT: A DESIGN FOR
CATALYZING AN EMERGING INDUSTRY (2009), available at http://www.cdfifund.gov
/what_we_do/resources/Investing%20for%20social%20and%20environmental%20impact
%20Monitor.pdf (providing an in-depth discussion of impact investing).
40. See, e.g., CALVERT FOUND., 2012 SOCIAL IMPACT REPORT 5 (2012), available at
http://www.calvertfoundation.org/storage/documents/social-impact-report-2012.pdf (indicating
that in 2012, the investment community was significant enough in size to ensure the Calvert
Foundation had $184 million in its lending portfolio); HOPE CONSULTING, MONEY FOR GOOD:
THE US MARKET FOR IMPACT INVESTMENTS AND CHARITABLE GIFTS FROM INDIVIDUAL DONORS
AND INVESTORS 61 (2010), available at http://www.hopeconsulting.us/pdf/Money%20for
%20Good_Final.pdf (estimating the impact investment market at $120 billion).
41. Brakman Reiser & Dean, supra note 8.
42. Cf. CALVERT FOUND., GATEWAYS TO IMPACT: INDUSTRY SURVEY OF FINANCIAL ADVISORS
ON SUSTAINABLE AND IMPACT INVESTING 1 (2012), available at http://www.gatewaystoimpact.org
/images/gatewaystoimpact.pdf (valuing the near-term market potential for sustainable investing
at $650 billion in the United States); FORUM FOR SUSTAINABLE AND RESPONSIBLE INV., REPORT
ON SUSTAINABLE AND RESPONSIBLE INVESTMENT TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 11 (2012),
available at http://www.ussif.org/files/Publications/12_Trends_Exec_Summary.pdf (reporting
that “$3.31 trillion in US-domiciled assets at year-end 2011 held by 443 institutional investors,
272 money managers and 1,043 community investment institutions that apply various
environmental, social and governance (ESG) criteria in their investment analysis and portfolio
selection” (emphasis omitted)).
43. See FORUM FOR SUSTAINABLE AND RESPONSIBLE INV., 2012 ANNUAL REPORT: US SIF
AND US SIF FOUNDATION 10 (2012), available at http://www.ussif.org/files/Publications
/USSIF_2012AnnualReport_F.pdf (finding annual increases in investment funds
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Responsible Investing found in its 2012 Trends Report that sustainably and
responsibly invested assets increased “22 percent from year-end 2009 to year-end
2011 to a total of $3.74 trillion.”44 The Forum explains this rise as “driven in part by
. . . the dramatic expansion in the number and assets of mutual funds and alternative
funds that consider environmental, social and governance criteria.”45 Of course,
socially responsible funds for retail investors vary in how they put their vision into
practice. Negative screens, such as prohibitions on investment in tobacco or
gambling companies, are easy and inexpensive to apply.46 Positive screening is more
challenging, requiring the investment vehicle to select criteria for screening in
socially responsible companies and then apply them.47 Whatever their approach, the
growth of socially responsible mutual funds demonstrates small investors’ appetites
for investing for blended value.
Mutual funds themselves, however, are unlikely to inject much capital into social
enterprises, which are primarily small and privately held. Under SEC guidance, an
open-end mutual fund cannot invest more than fifteen percent of its assets in private

incorporating ESG factors from 2001 onward); see also Ronald J. Colombo, The Naked
Private Square, 51 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 22 (2013) (reporting research showing growth of SRI
mutual fund category); Joel C. Dobris, SRI—Shibboleth or Canard (Socially Responsible
Investing, That Is), 42 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 755, 757, 762–65 (2008) (observing that
“social investing is hot”).
44. FORUM FOR SUSTAINABLE AND RESPONSIBLE INV., supra note 43, at 10. According to
its 2012 Trends Report:
The total assets that are managed according to ESG [(environmental, social and
governance)] factors that are explicitly incorporated into investment analysis and
decision-making are valued at $3.31 trillion. Of this total, $1.41 trillion were
identified within specific investment vehicles managed by money managers or
community investing institutions, while $2.48 trillion were identified as owned
or administered by institutional investors. Of these institutional ESG assets,
$581.6 billion were managed for institutions through investment vehicles
captured in research on money managers.
FORUM FOR SUSTAINABLE AND RESPONSIBLE INV., supra note 42, at 12.
45. FORUM FOR SUSTAINABLE AND RESPONSIBLE INV., supra note 43, at 10.
46. Cf. Michael S. Knoll, Ethical Screening in Modern Financial Markets: The
Conflicting Claims Underlying Socially Responsible Investment, 57 BUS. LAW. 681, 686
(2002) (“According to the Social Investment Forum (SIF), the umbrella group for SRI
professionals and organizations, as of 2000, the most common screen is for tobacco, with
ninety-six percent of all screened assets steered away from tobacco. The next most common
screens are for gambling, alcohol, and weapons. According to the SIF, more than eight out of
every ten dollars in screened assets are in portfolios that avoid companies in each of these
industries.” (footnote omitted)).
47. Id. at 687 (Positive screening “is more difficult to implement . . . because investors
cannot simply look at the nature of the business in the broadest sense. Instead they must
examine corporate performance in detail, and the information they seek is often not public nor
easy to get. Even if investors can get the information, it is likely to be in a form that is difficult
or expensive to evaluate. Moreover, investors, once they have evaluated the information, are
often left balancing performance across areas: a company that does very well in some areas
might do poorly in others.” (footnote omitted)).
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companies.48 Practical constraints are an even more important factor.49 Mutual funds
need liquidity and transparency in their investments to allow them to set appropriate
prices for their open-end investors.50 Even small-cap and growth funds will shy away
from many social enterprises based on their size alone. Their double bottom lines
further impede mutual fund investment, as assessing these companies and their
prospects will require even greater time and resources than other private companies
of a similar size.
Individuals save for retirement through mutual funds, but trillions of dollars in
retirement assets are also managed directly by public and other pension funds.51
ERISA and fiduciary obligations will add to the difficulty of using these funds to
capitalize social enterprises.52 Social enterprise explicitly contemplates the
possibility of trading financial return for social good. Pension funds investing pooled
assets in the best interests of future claimants will often be unwilling, and may be
unable, to embrace such a tradeoff.
The retail investment market holds a deep pool of capital that could be used to
start and scale social enterprises, and the evidence suggests many retail investors
would be interested in investing for a blend of financial and social return. But mutual
and pension funds do not provide ready vehicles for matching investor capital and
social enterprise. Crowdfunding platforms may provide an attractive alternative.

48. See Janet Kiholm Smith, Richard L. Smith & Karyn Williams, The SEC’s “Fair
Value” Standard for Mutual Fund Investment in Restricted Shares and Other Illiquid
Securities, 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 421, 446–47 (2001) (“Based on concerns that
open-end funds maintain adequate liquidity, the SEC recommends that they limit investments
in illiquid assets to a maximum of ten to fifteen percent of fund value. Even open-end funds
that specifically target investments in small and early-stage companies have adopted the SEC’s
guidelines.” (footnote omitted)).
49. See Rachel Louise Ensign, Fundamentals of Investing: Buying Stocks Before They Go
Public, WALL ST. J., May 2, 2011, at R2 (describing the risks and potential benefits of mutual
fund investments in private companies).
50. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The Institutional Investor as
Corporate Monitor, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1277, 1318–19 (1991) (describing the “acute”
liquidity concerns of open-end mutual funds as well as their “need to be able to report the
current market value of their investments”).
51. See PHILLIP VIDAL, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ANNUAL SURVEY OF PUBLIC PENSIONS:
STATE- AND LOCALLY-ADMINISTERED DEFINED BENEFIT DATA SUMMARY REPORT: 2013, at 2
(2015), available at http://www2.census.gov/govs/retire/g13-aspp-sl.pdf (finding “[t]otal
holdings and investments for state- and locally-administered pension systems grew by 8.7
percent, from $3.0 trillion in 2012 to $3.3 trillion in 2013”); see also TOWERS WATSON, GLOBAL
PENSION ASSETS STUDY 2013 4, 7 (2013), available at http://www.towerswatson.com/en
/Insights/IC-Types/Survey-Research-Results/2013/01/Global-Pensions-Asset-Study-2013
(detailing the trillions of dollars in value in global pension funds).
52. See Dobris, supra note 43, at 771 (noting that “fiduciary duties . . . currently seem to
forbid (or at least frown on) [Socially Responsible Investing]”); Maria O’Brien Hylton,
“Socially Responsible” Investing: Doing Good Versus Doing Well in an Inefficient Market,
42 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 40 (1992) (“These twin obligations of the ERISA fiduciary, the duties of
loyalty and of prudence, form the crux of the debate concerning the propriety of ethical
investing. Opponents of SRI argue vigorously that SRI practitioners violate these two duties
whenever a trustee favors a social cause over the beneficiaries’ financial gain.”).
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B. The Promise of Crowdfunding
Crowdfunding is the practice of aggregating funds from many small investors,
typically using an online platform.53 Crowdfunding addresses a well-known gap in
financing, for companies and projects with prospects too uncertain to qualify for
bank loans as well as business plans too small or esoteric to attract angel investors or
venture capital funding.54 Sites use various models to entice investors: pure donation
models offering only psychic income, reward models that offer investors a set of
tiered rewards for their participation (often including the product of the project they
are funding), lending models that may or may not offer investors any interest, and
equity models providing investors shares in exchange for their contributions.55
Highly publicized runaway crowdfunding hits like smartwatch manufacturer Pebble
have raised millions of dollars56 through reward crowdfunding sites like Kickstarter57
and Indiegogo.58 These sites, as well as lending-based crowdfunding platforms,
however, market themselves much more broadly as vehicles for funding projects for
whom traditional financing is unavailable or priced out of reach.59
Advocates see crowdfunding not only as a means to bridge the capital gap for
small businesses but also as an opportunity to open up business investment to a wider
class of investors. Investments in startups have traditionally been available only to
the exceedingly well-heeled. Some see crowdfunding as a means to democratize
investment in small and startup businesses,60 offering individual nonaccredited

53. See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities Laws, 2012
COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 10.
54. See id. at 100–04.
55. See id. at 10–14.
56. Deborah Netburn, Pebble Smartwatch Raises $4.7 Million on Kickstarter Funding Site,
L.A. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2012/apr/18/business/la-fi-tn-pebble
-smart-watch-kickstarter-20120418; see also David McGrail, “Crowdfunding” a Chapter 11
Plan, AM. BANKR. INST. J., Feb. 2013, at 30, 30 (“Oculus Rift, which is producing a ‘truly
immersive virtual reality headset for video games,’ raised about $2.5 million.”).
57. See Seven Things To Know About Kickstarter, KICKSTARTER, http://www.kickstarter.com
/hello?ref=nav.
58. See Indiegogo Basics, INDIEGOGO, http://www.indiegogo.com/indiegogo-faq.
59. See Lisa T. Alexander, Cyberfinancing for Economic Justice, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L.
REV. 309, 336–37 (2012) (describing lending-based crowdfunding as “enabl[ing] economically
marginal and geographically isolated borrowers to obtain loans on terms that were otherwise
difficult for them to obtain through traditional or even fringe financial markets”); see also, e.g.,
How It Works, INDIEGOGO, http://www.indiegogo.com/learn-how-to-raise-money-for-a
-campaign (noting that using their website launching a fundraising campaign “takes only
minutes”); Peer-to-Peer Lending Means Everyone Prospers, PROSPER, http://www.prosper.com
/welcome/how-it-works/ (explaining its platform as designed to “cut out the middleman to
connect people who need money with those who have money to invest”); Where Businesses
Looking for Funding Can Meet Real People To Lend, LINKEDFINANCE.COM, https://
linkedfinance.com/business-loans/investment/crowdfundingIreland.html (“At LinkedFinance,
we offer trustworthy small businesses a new viable alternative to borrowing from the banks. Real
people like you can lend small amounts to great Irish businesses at very attractive interest rates.
The Banks get bypassed, the wheels keep turning and everyone wins!”).
60. See, e.g., Joan MacLeod Heminway & Shelden Ryan Hoffman, Proceed at Your
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investors a chance to participate and, perhaps, to profit. Of course, detractors worry
these unsophisticated investors will make foolish choices and fall prey to fraudsters,
condemning crowdfunding as little more than an “alluring trap.”61 After all, if
successful, crowdfunding aggregates many investments, each so small they justify little
investigation, into an enticing pot for both true innovators and those intent on fraud.
Clearly, crowdfunding requires careful regulation to balance its ability to open a
potentially rich source of capital for small business with its potential for harm to an
unsophisticated investor population. A growing literature already debates the optimal
regulatory approach, much in response to the proposals and ultimate provisions of the
2012 JOBS Act.62 The Act permits crowdfunded securities to be sold through registered
funding portals subject to less regulation than other issues63 and for the first time permits
equity crowdfunding in the United States. The SEC remains at work drafting the final
regulations under which funding portals would operate.64 The United Kingdom has
somewhat deeper experience: businesses there have already raised over one billion

Peril: Crowdfunding and the Securities Act of 1933, 78 TENN. L. REV. 879, 962 (2011)
(pointing out “crowdfunding’s promise—as a means of raising investment funds for small
businesses and allowing individual retail investors to access a user-friendly business finance
market”); James J. Williamson, Comment, The Jobs Act and Middle-Income Investors: Why
It Doesn’t Go Far Enough, 122 YALE L.J. 2069, 2073–74 (2013) (“True equity investments
would allow small businesses the chance to achieve a broader funding base, but they remained
blocked by the 1933 Act’s restrictions.”); Caron Beesley, Crowdfunding—Is It Right for Your
Business? Where Do You Start?, U.S. SMALL BUS. ASS’N (July 8, 2013), http://www.sba.gov
/community/blogs/crowdfunding-%E2%80%93-it-right-your-business-where-do-you-start;
Tom Szaky, Why Start-Ups Need ‘Crowd-Funding,’ N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2011, 1:00 PM),
http://boss.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/12/05/why-start-ups-need-crowd-funding/ (As chief
executive of recycling company TerraCycle, Szaky states that equity crowdfunding “would have
reduced the pressure on us to produce big returns for each investor, because each investor would
have had less at risk. It also would have given us access to more people who would have been
vested in our success, which would have produced more leads and opened more doors.”).
61. Michael B. Dorff, The Siren Call of Equity Crowdfunding 31 (Sept. 13, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2325634; see also Bradford,
supra note 53, at 105–09 (describing the high risks of failure and fraud in small business
investment, as well as the risks and costs of the illiquidity of such investments).
62. E.g., Bradford, supra note 53; Heminway & Hoffman, supra note 60; Andrew A.
Schwartz, Crowdfunding Securities, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1457 (2013); J.D. Harrison, Can
Crowdfunding Fill Stock Market’s “Black Hole” for Startups and Small Businesses?,
WASHINGTONPOST.COM (Aug. 26, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/on-small
-business/can-crowdfunding-fill-stock-markets-black-hole-for-startups-and-small-businesses
/2013/08/26/0098dc9c-0e64-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html.
63. JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 302, 126 Stat. 306, 315 (2012); see also Jumpstart
Our Business Startups Act Frequently Asked Questions About Crowdfunding Intermediaries,
U.S. SEC. EXCHANGE COMMISSION (May 7, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/marketreg
/tmjobsact-crowdfundingintermediariesfaq.htm.
64. In the meantime, equity crowdfunding enthusiasts have developed creative equity-like
products to fit investor demands. See, e.g., Iris Dorbian, A Twist on Crowdfunding: New Sites
Let Startups Give Backers a Temporary Piece of the Profits, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2013, at
R3 (“The twist is in what backers get in return. The entrepreneurs agree to give backers a small
percentage of their earnings each month for a certain period. In effect, they’re selling a
temporary equity stake in themselves.”).
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pounds using equity crowdfunding platforms,65 but it remains a novel approach. We
leave to securities law experts the questions of whether and how the JOBS Act or other
interventions might properly balance the advantages and disadvantages of
crowdfunding in general. Instead, our purpose here is to identify and address the unique
obstacles involved in using crowdfunding to capitalize social enterprises.
After all, crowdfunding seems tailor-made for social enterprises. It offers a source
of funding for small, private companies. Most social enterprises are small, all are
privately held,66 and nearly all need financing. Crowdfunding allows nonaccredited
“everyday” investors to take part in financing startup businesses. Crowdfunding
success occurs when a project stirs the interests (and often the heartstrings) of a large
pool of potential investors reached online. Social enterprises embrace a community
ethic, and their double-bottom-line vision fits with crowdfunding platforms’
commitments to funding creativity and inspiration. Social enterprise founders,
employees, and customers already have much in common with the hipster, millennial
crowd involved in crowdfunding. Using crowdfunding to attract their capital as well
seems like a no-brainer.67 Social enterprises, however, face unique and serious
challenges in accessing capital—and crowdfunding only magnifies them.

65. Tanya Powley, Kevin McCloud Turns to Crowdfunding for Property Business, FIN.
TIMES (London), Aug. 3, 2013, at 4; see also Juliet Mann, Is Tapping the Crowds the Future
of Funding?, CNN (Nov. 18, 2011, 3:30 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/11/17/world/europe
/crowd-funding-europe/index.html?iref=allsearch.
66. As this article goes to press, one business some would deem a social enterprise is
poised to go public. Etsy, the online craft marketplace, announced a price range for its
impending IP on March 31, 2015. See Michael J. de la Merced, Etsy Sets Price Range for Its
I.P.O., N.Y TIMES (Mar. 31, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/01/business/dealbook
/etsy-sets-price-range-for-its-ipo.html. The for-profit company embraces a social mission,
describing “Etsy’s mission [a]s to reimagine commerce in ways that build a more fulfilling
and lasting world.” About, ETSY, https://www.etsy.com/about/?ref=ftr. Etsy’s IPO is a major
event for the social enterprise sector, but highly unusual.
67. Cf. J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications,
and Benefit Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 1, 49–51 (2012) (“The potential
blended value return offered by social enterprises, which may often be a below-market
financial return, may be more appealing to a large number of people who only have to part
with small amounts of money than it would be to a few people investing very large amounts
of money.” (emphasis in original)); Chance Barnett, Will Crowdfunding Ignite Investing for
Profits and Purpose?, FORBES.COM (Aug. 9, 2012, 11:10 AM), http://www.forbes.com
/sites/chancebarnett/2012/08/09/will-crowdfunding-ignite-investing-for-profits-purpose/
(“Consumers want to align their money with their values and are choosing triple-bottom-line
brands that support people, the planet, and profit . . . . [A] company with a purpose is becoming
increasingly important to investors—rather than just making a quick buck at the expense of
society or the environment.” (emphasis omitted)); see also Shruti Rana, Philanthropic
Innovation and Creative Capitalism: A Historical and Comparative Perspective on Social
Entrepreneurship and Corporate Social Responsibility, 64 ALA. L. REV. 1121, 1167–68
(2013) (describing the campaign by Escape the City, a U.K.–based website for professionals
shifting careers to the nonprofit sector, which raised over $800,000 on the equity
crowdfunding website Crowdcube).
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C. Capitalizing Social Enterprise
Entrepreneurs and investors committed to pursuing both profits and social good
find themselves in the same quandary.68 Neither can succeed in their aims without
the other, but both fear entrusting their ideas and resources to someone whose
motivations are necessarily suspect. Crowdfunding exacerbates the need for
assurances yet makes them harder to provide. The large numbers of investors—and
the modest size of each investment—make the communication essential to building
that trust virtually impossible.69
An entrepreneur sets up a social enterprise with dual goals in mind—earning a
financial return and providing some social good like environmental conservation,
poverty reduction, or education. The need for capital to survive or scale up pushes
social entrepreneurs to seek investors. But, having committed significant amounts of
their own time, energy, and often financial resources to their enterprises, social
entrepreneurs (like all entrepreneurs) worry about the potential power of investors to
steer them away from their visions.70
Whereas an entrepreneur might be able to suss out the bona fides of one or a few
large investors and craft individualized commitment devices to limit risk,
crowdfunding would involve numerous small investors, making such artisanal
arrangements impossible. As noted earlier, the corporate hybrid forms springing up
across the country continue to permit shareholders to abandon an adopting
enterprise’s social mission, so long as a supermajority of shareholders agree.71
Although the potentially huge sums of capital crowdfunding platforms could reach
will be enticing to entrepreneurs, they have reason to hesitate at the thought of a
“crowd” of investors, especially shareholders empowered to overthrow social
mission if the price proves right.
The challenge for capitalizing social enterprises, though, is two-sided. Investors
devoted to achieving a blend of financial and social returns will be equally suspect
of entrepreneurs’ commitment to social mission—perhaps even more so. Again,
when large individual investors are involved, these suspicions can be overcome
through carefully negotiated creative deals.72 A specialized financing structure can
lock entrepreneurs and investors into their commitments, or at least create credible

68. The quandary is one economists refer to as a “stag hunt.” As described below, the
basic notion is that two hunters must find a way to rely on one another to achieve a mutually
desired result: catching a stag. See infra note 89 and accompanying text.
69. Central to game theory are the challenges of promoting mutually beneficial coordination
in the absence of communication, illustrated by the famous “focal point” thought experiment in
which individuals are asked to choose a time and place to meet in New York without the
opportunity to speak to the other person. See infra notes 84–85 and accompanying text.
70. The apocryphal story of Ben & Jerry’s may reveal more about the anxiety outside
investors stir in entrepreneurs than it does about the circumstances surrounding the social
enterprise’s sale to Unilever. See Antony Page & Robert A. Katz, The Truth About Ben &
Jerry’s, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION REV., Fall 2012, at 39, 39 (questioning widespread belief that
going public forced the founders to sell to Unilever).
71. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
72. See generally Brakman Reiser & Dean, supra note 8 (proposing a contingent
convertible debt instrument designed to promote trust between investors and entrepreneurs).
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signals, but arcane financial instruments will not work for small-fry crowdfunding
investors. Incorporated hybrid forms do require supermajority shareholder approval
to permanently shift an adopting entity to pure for-profit status, offering the hope of
investor protection.73 This hope may be unwarranted, however, as the only tools for
enforcement are commands that fiduciaries “consider” or “balance” profit and social
goals, weak and costly claims of fiduciary-duty breach, and disclosure.74 In the
absence of a robust enforcement mechanism, with or without the use of specialized
forms, small investors have little recourse against an entrepreneur who casts aside an
enterprise’s social mission.
Small investors operating as part of a “crowd” face the further risk that fellow
investors may come to prefer a purely profit-driven firm. A social enterprise with
one or a handful of nonfounder investors could once again negotiate and structure a
deal to provide assurances. Crowdfund investors with no control, or indeed
knowledge, of their fellow investors will have greater need for assurances from their
peers and no ability to contract for (or with) those other investors. The current
corporate hybrids’ supermajority rules leave individual investors at the mercy of
large players, or a large group of small players.75 If enough of the crowd decides to
cash in, the stalwart social investor will be left out in the cold.76 Even formerly
committed dual-mission investors may join a sellout rather than engage in a costly
fight to halt what may seem like an inevitable result.
The opportunity to reach millions of small investors simultaneously through
online platforms is an exciting one for social enterprises in need of capital infusions.
Legalizing and optimally regulating crowdfunding platforms, however, will not
suffice to enable social enterprises to access this new stream of capital.77
Individualized arrangements are ill suited to the crowdfunding context,78 and current
hybrid forms neither ensure nor even credibly signal commitment to social mission
on either side.79 In the crowdfunding context, social entrepreneurs will need a reliable
mechanism to differentiate committed impact investors in the crowd; investors need
a strong signal to reassure them their investment is not a foolhardy leap of faith.80

73. See id. at 1511 & n.80, 1513 & n.88.
74. See, e.g., Dana Brakman Reiser, Theorizing Forms for Social Enterprise, 62 EMORY
L.J. 681, 694–704 nn.54–92 (2013) (discussing corporate governance mechanisms for
enforcing dual missions).
75. Of course, controlling shareholders owe a fiduciary duty to their corporations, and
their transactions can be subjected to a fairness review. See Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295,
306 (1939) (“A director is a fiduciary. So is a dominant or controlling stockholder or group of
stockholders.” (citation omitted)). But, at least in an ordinary corporation, this fiduciary
obligation would be unlikely to extend to maintaining a commitment to pursuing social good
in the face of an opportunity for profit—personal or corporate.
76. In some cases, appraisal may be available. But, appraisal remedies offer only monetary
compensation, which may not make disappointed social investors or entrepreneurs whole.
77. The challenges presented by these tasks are, of course, considerable. See supra note
61 and accompanying text.
78. See supra text accompanying note 72.
79. See supra text accompanying note 71.
80. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text.
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II. COMMITMENT
To successfully husband a social enterprise, entrepreneurs and investors dedicated
to pursuing a double bottom line of profits and social good must telegraph that
resolve to one another. Devising means to persuade others of such commitments lies
at the heart of game theory.81 This Part first describes the “game” that impedes the
flow of capital to social enterprises, then shows how the SE(c)(3) tax regime can
serve as both a commitment device and the credible signal needed to encourage the
participation of even the small investors that occupy the crowdfunding space.
A. Assurance Game
In some respects, social enterprises are no different from other ventures. Every
venture, wherever it lies on the profit spectrum, metabolizes a blend of capital and
ideas. Beyond such commonalities, social enterprises stand apart, both in terms of their
strengths and their weaknesses. On the one hand, social enterprises’ shared emphasis
on profits and social good allows them to lash the idealism of charity to the rigor of
business methods;82 on the other, serving two masters presents its own challenges.83
Traditional for-profit businesses enjoy the benefit of an obvious focal point
(profit) around which entrepreneurs and investors can gather.84 Social enterprise
lacks the benefit of a singular, galvanizing objective—a meeting spot so obvious that
coordination becomes superfluous.85 When investors and entrepreneurs combine
their capital and labor to form a for-profit corporation, profit provides such inviting
common ground that the mechanisms provided by state law to ensure consensus may
sometimes be superfluous.86 So long as profit remains the most salient corporate
goal, it need not be the only permissible objective.
Social enterprises do not have that luxury. Given the presence of two equally
compelling goals, double-bottom-line investors and entrepreneurs face a more
complex task in aligning their interests. Setting aside questions of simple fraud,87 any

81. See THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 28 (1960) (noting that
strategic bargaining—an aspect of game theory—relies “not only on incurring a commitment
but on communicating it persuasively to the other party”).
82. See supra text accompanying notes 28–29.
83. See Dana Brakman Reiser, For-Profit Philanthropy, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2437, 2466
(2009) (noting the risk of a “shifting mission” when an enterprise attempts to combine
for-profit and charitable aims).
84. See SCHELLING, supra note 81, at 54–58 (considering capacity of “focal points” to
promote tacit coordination when communication is difficult).
85. The classic illustration of such a meeting spot arises in the experiment in which
individuals—given the task of meeting another person in New York with no prior coordination—
reliably choose to meet at the Grand Central Terminal information booth at noon. Id. at 55 n.1.
86. The state law requirement that corporations maximize shareholder wealth—whether
real or perceived—offers an example of the ways in which state law serves to align the interests
of entrepreneurs and investors. That requirement, although contested, helped inspire the
creation of hybrid forms designed to house social enterprises by being seen as a threat to
ventures open to objectives other than maximizing profits. See Brakman Reiser & Dean, supra
note 8, at 1503–06.
87. See supra note 61 and accompanying text.
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stakeholder might reasonably wonder whether others share her commitment to
balancing both objectives.88
The resulting uncertainty creates what economists call an “assurance game” or
“stag hunt.”89 In the classic illustration of this game, two hunters can fell a stag if
they work as a team but only hares if they work on their own. Assurance games such
as this stylized hunt offer participants two plausible objectives. Unless each hunter
offers a robust signal of their commitment to capture a stag, both will hunt hares to
avoid returning home empty-handed. A successful stag hunt would provide the most
food for both hunters, but each needs assurance that the other will not defect.
When a small number of deep-pocketed investors join forces with an
entrepreneur, it would be possible to manufacture the missing focal point, effectively
ridding the forest of hares.90 They could, in other words, reach an “enforceable
agreement” that would produce “the only possible focal point for the necessary
subsequent tacit collaboration . . . [so that] no one has a unilateral preference . . . to
do anything but what he is expected to do.”91 Such an approach would allow
sophisticated entrepreneurs and investors to achieve the entrepreneurial equivalent
of tearing a treasure map in half to ensure reciprocal loyalty.92
Private agreement, like the treasure map gambit, has practical limits.93 As described
in Part I, social enterprise crowdfunding provides a stark illustration of those
limitations. Retail crowdfunding, drawing a substantial number of insubstantial
investments to nurture the growth of an enterprise, would inevitably involve groups too
large to squeeze into the conference room of a law firm where a hybrid financial

88. See, e.g., Brakman Reiser & Dean, supra note 8, at 1514–17 (noting that even with
the help of hybrid forms designed to house social enterprise, entrepreneurs and investors have
reason to remain wary of one another).
89. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD, ROBERT GERTNER & RANDAL C. PICKER, GAME THEORY AND
THE LAW 35–36 (1994) (describing the “stag hunt” game). The assurance game is distinct from
the better known “prisoners’ dilemma” game. See Richard H. McAdams, Beyond the
Prisoners’ Dilemma: Coordination , Game Theory, and Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 220–22
(2009) (explaining that an assurance game differs from the prisoners’ dilemma game because
the proverbial hunters can share the big prize—the stag—while in the classic prisoners’
dilemma at most one prisoner will go free).
90. If the forest could be stripped bare of hares, there would be no need for either hunter
to commit to the stag hunt since the temptation to defect would no longer exist. The stag would
have become a focal point of sorts for the hunters, allowing tacit cooperation between them.
91. SCHELLING, supra note 81, at 135.
92. The hybrid financial instrument we call FLY (Flexible Low-Yield) Paper would
accomplish precisely that by eliminating founders’ incentives and investors’ opportunities to
defect. See Brakman Reiser & Dean, supra note 8, at 1523–25. As lenders, outside investors
would not acquire control of the enterprise. Founders could not sell their shares without
triggering a conversion right that those outside investors could use to seize control along with
the founders’ financial rewards. Like a forest without hares, a social enterprise financed with
FLY Paper would solve the assurance problem by eliminating the incentives for defection.
93. A map torn into a hundred pieces simply becomes confetti. Abramowicz and Ayres
reach a similar conclusion with regard to their own variant of a commitment device. See
Michael Abramowicz & Ian Ayres, Commitment Bonds, 100 GEO. L.J. 605, 646 (2011) (noting
that when adapting their commitment bonds to involve mutual commitment among multiple
parties, “it may be difficult to reach an agreement”).
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instrument might be crafted.94 No less important, those crowdfunded investments
would almost certainly be too small to justify the costs of reaching such an agreement.
B. A Commitment Device for Crowdfunding Social Enterprise
Fortunately, private agreement represents only one possible solution to the
quandary faced by double-bottom-line investors and entrepreneurs. Although hybrid
forms have proved inadequate to the task of striking a balance between social
enterprise’s dual missions, they represent only one arrow in the public’s quiver.95
Government intervention to permit likeminded entrepreneurs and investors to
reassure one another could take a very different form. By providing social enterprises
and their investors with an environment that rewards a commitment to a double
bottom line but imposes steep costs on defectors, the state could create an
off-the-rack alternative to the designer arrangements considered above. Moreover,
the signal such an alternative sends to social entrepreneurs and socially minded
investors looking to identify committed counterparts is the key for social enterprises
to access retail investors and their capital.
The SE(c)(3) tax regime described in Part III provides an example of such an
intervention. Allowing investors and entrepreneurs to embrace a tax regime that
imposes costs on those who stray from the pursuit of a double bottom line offers a
commitment mechanism within the reach of even the smallest investors. By pairing
favorable treatment for mission-driven income with higher tax rates on shareholder
profits, the SE(c)(3) regime provides a readymade signal of a commitment to a
double bottom line. On an individual basis, or through crowdfunding platforms that
use SE(c)(3) status as a sorting mechanism, investors seeking blended value will be
able to find true fellow travelers and reliably dual-mission firms.
Such arrangements designed to bolster resolve, known as commitment devices,
have a pedigree every bit as distinguished as the notion of the assurance game.96
Ulysses, of course, bound himself to the mast to allow him to listen to the sirens
without endangering himself or his crew.97 Today, commitment devices employing
the same core principles operate in a variety of contexts.98 Smokers hoping to quit,
dieters, and even policymakers aiming to reach a consensus have relied on
commitment devices with varying levels of success.99

94. See supra text accompanying note 53.
95. See supra text accompanying note 9.
96. An army that eliminates all hope of retreat by literally burning the bridge behind it
would “commit” itself to battle and signal that commitment to a potential adversary.
Telegraphing that commitment could discourage an attack by the potential adversary. See Jon
Elster, Don’t Burn Your Bridge Before You Come to It: Some Ambiguities and Complexities
of Precommitment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1751, 1761–63 (2003).
97. See HOMER, THE ODYSSEY 272–73 (Robert Fagles trans., 1996).
98. Central banks, through which governments precommit themselves to anti-inflationary
policies, offer an illustration of precommitment quite different from the reformed smokers and
drinkers usually considered. See Elster, supra note 96, at 1763–64 (explaining that
governments use independent central banks to ensure that future governments will not
abandon anti-inflationary goals in the face of future policy pressures).
99. See Thomas C. Schelling, Enforcing Rules on Oneself, 1 J. L ECON. & ORG. 357,
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Whatever their aim, two characteristics largely determine the degree to which
commitment devices allow a group or individual to “bind” themselves to a particular
course of action.100 For a commitment device to be effective, one must first be able
to determine whether a promise has been kept.101 The European Union financial
crisis, for instance, might not have occurred had Greece not been able to disguise its
borrowing, maintaining the appearance of a sober debt-to-GDP ratio without the
burden of actually limiting its debt.102 Because it relied on an inadequate definition
of a loan, the European Union Growth and Stability Pact103 proved to be a paper tiger
despite its sophisticated monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.104
Once compliance can be reliably distinguished from cheating, the emphasis shifts
to enforcement. Here, the critical issue is the existence of an individual or entity with
the authority to enforce a commitment.105 A would-be drunk driver who has given
his keys to a sober companion will be better protected than one who merely enlists a
friend to counsel him. Entrusting keys to a reliable third party will be more effective
because it relies on the actions of the sober friend rather than on the willingness of
an inebriated potential driver to accept advice after he has become intoxicated.106
Along both dimensions, the SE(c)(3) regime offers an appealing combination of
simplicity and strength.107 The core of the regime—the relatively high rates imposed
on shareholder profits—does not ask tax authorities to step outside their traditional
roles of measuring and taxing income.108 Since highly profitable social enterprises

357–61 (1985) (referring to a wide range of circumstances in which a commitment device
might be deployed).
100. See Elster, supra note 96, at 1754 (“When precommitting himself, a person acts at
one point in time in order to ensure that at some later time he will perform an act that he could
but would not have performed without that prior act.”).
101. See Schelling, supra note 99, at 366–67 (“It seems more likely that one will abide by a
self-imposed rule if it is perfectly clear whether or not the rule has been adhered to or violated.”).
102. See Louise Story, Landon Thomas Jr. & Nelson D. Schwartz, Wall St. Helped To
Mask Debts Shaking Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2010, at A1 (noting that Greece’s ability
to disguise its borrowing—thereby avoiding the consequences threatened by the Pact—lay at
the heart of the debt crisis).
103. See Stability and Growth Pact, EUR. COMMISSION, http://ec.europa.eu/economy
_finance/economic_governance/sgp/index_en.htm.
104. See Story et al., supra note 102.
105. See Schelling, supra note 99, at 373 (noting that a commitment device enforced by a
referee (possessing merely moral authority) will be less effective than one enforced by a judge
(possessing actual authority)).
106. See id.
107. Rather than monitoring one another directly or relying on state attorneys general to
oversee the actions of entrepreneurs and investors, the regime invokes the monitoring and
enforcement architecture of the corporate income tax. Although not without its flaws—
particularly in the cross-border context—the corporate tax can and does measure shareholder
profits. Collecting the additional tax imposed on shareholders via the SE(c)(3) regime would
impose no significant administrative burdens on tax authorities.
108. Disguising distributions of corporate profits as capital gains in order to qualify for low
tax rates—referred to as “bailout transactions”—has a long history in the corporate income tax
context. See Eric M. Zolt, Corporate Taxation After the Tax Reform Act of 1986: A State of
Disequilibrium, 66 N.C. L. REV. 839, 852 (1988) (noting that even before 1986 “a large part
of corporate tax planning focused on extracting funds out of corporations in transactions that
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will almost certainly bear the substantial burden the SE(c)(3) regime promises,
investors and entrepreneurs intent on maximizing such profits would find little to
love in the SE(c)(3) regime. SE(c)(3) status also provides a strong but simple signal.
Nascent crowdfunding sites unable to devote many resources to screening the
mission commitments of their issuers can leverage the work of the tax system to
reach a socially conscious class of retail investors. If she understood the commitment
device SE(c)(3) status represents, an individual investor could even do so on her own.
C. Subsidy Vs. Commitment Device
Governments frequently use tax laws to encourage or discourage particular
behaviors.109 By offering individuals or businesses a credit or deduction for a particular
expense, or an exclusion for a specific type of income, a legislature can put a thumb on
the scale in favor of owning a home or saving for retirement.110 These provisions,
known as “tax expenditures,” provide a subsidy for favored activities. Tax penalties do
just the opposite, discouraging disfavored behavior such as bribery.111
Combining elements of both, the SE(c)(3) regime is neither a subsidy granted to
nor a penalty imposed on taxpayers.112 Instead, claiming the SE(c)(3) exclusion
constitutes a commitment by a corporate social enterprise to pursuing a double
bottom line. Like agreeing to send a big check to an unappealing charity for each
cigarette smoked or pound gained, claiming the exclusion represents a “self-limiting
act carried out by an agent for the purpose of achieving a better outcome, as assessed
by his preferences at the time of action, than what would occur had he retained his
full freedom of action.”113 Agreeing to pay a higher tax on shareholder profits today
constrains the SE(c)(3)’s freedom to pursue future profits.
The subsidy aspect of the SE(c)(3) regime distinguishes it from a typical
commitment device. In addition to the benefits of commitment—here, increased
access to capital rather than weight loss—the SE(c)(3) regime compensates

qualified for capital gain treatment”). The corporate income tax has been crafted in large part
in response to the pressures of such bailout transactions. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 302, 304 (2012)
(creating an elaborate antibailout system treating sales of shares that would ordinarily receive
exchange treatment as dividends). The SE(c)(3) regime would operate in large part by
leveraging the statutory and doctrinal safeguards created to prevent bailouts.
109. This phenomenon received critical attention in the United States decades ago. See
STANLEY S. SURREY, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPT OF TAX EXPENDITURES 6
(1973) (noting that although the economic equivalent of “direct government expenditures,”
tax benefits largely escaped “critical analysis”).
110. See Linda Sugin, Tax Expenditures, Reform, and Distributive Justice, 3 COLUM. J.
TAX L. 1, 3 (2011) (“Tax expenditure provisions were adopted to incentivize particular
activities or to reduce the burden on certain individuals, families or businesses.”).
111. See Eric M. Zolt, Deterrence via Taxation: A Critical Analysis of Tax Penalty
Provisions, 37 UCLA L. REV. 343, 350–51 (1989) (“Congress now uses tax penalty provisions
to increase the cost of illegal activities by disallowing deductions for amounts paid for fines
or similar penalties, bribes or kickbacks, . . . certain losses incurred in connection with illegal
activities, and expenses incurred in drug trafficking.” (footnotes omitted)).
112. As described in detail in Part III, the regime combines an exclusion for up to $500,000
per year of a corporation’s income with special higher rates on shareholder profits.
113. Elster, supra note 96, at 1783 (emphasis omitted).
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participating social enterprises by providing a tax benefit in the form of an exclusion
for mission-driven income.114 Like the up-front payment received by issuers of the
compensating commitment bonds proposed by Abramowicz and Ayres, the
exclusion creates a dynamic closer to a “fair bet rather than a one-way ratchet.”115 In
both cases, the commitment contemplates both costs and benefits for the agent
seeking to constrain her own future behavior.
Although they may escape the scrutiny imposed on other forms of spending,116
tax expenditures reduce government revenues.117 Tax penalties, of course, do the
reverse.118 In the aggregate, the SE(c)(3) regime would represent neither a special
benefit nor a particular burden for the social enterprise sector. For individual
ventures, the impact of the SE(c)(3) regime is a function of balancing mission and
profit. Social enterprises emphasizing mission would benefit while “greenwashed”
ventures prioritizing shareholder profits would suffer.
The SE(c)(3) regime, unlike that governing nonprofits, does not forbid a social
enterprise from promoting shareholders’ financial interests.119 When an SE(c)(3)
deemphasizes mission in favor of the financial gains of its owners, the result is a
higher tax burden. Those increased taxes cross-subsidize the lighter burden enjoyed
by more mission-focused enterprises. Rather than drawing resources away from or
directing them to the social enterprise sector, the SE(c)(3) regime simply siphons a
portion of outsized shareholder profits to nurture the missions of other ventures.120

114. See infra Part III.A.3.
115. Abramowicz & Ayres, supra note 93, at 607–08. Compensating commitment bonds
aim to provide a commitment device with a modest expected value to a committing party (the
certain up-front payment and the possibility of the future penalty being more or less equal). Id.
The SE(c)(3) regime obviously does not tailor the size of the exclusion or the rates applicable
to shareholder profits to match the commitment (or lack thereof) of particular social enterprises.
Instead, the regime will be designed to preserve the current tax treatment of a prototypical social
enterprise. Ventures generating a disproportionate amount of mission-driven income or
shareholder profits will bear lower and higher tax burdens, respectively.
116. See supra note 109.
117. Since the 1970s, an annual budget of the costs of tax expenditures has been required
by statute. See Congressional Budget Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, § 3, 88 Stat. 297, 299.
118. See Zolt, supra note 111, at 360 (contemplating a “tax penalty budget” that would
estimate the government revenues generated by tax penalties).
119. Commitment devices operate either “by deleting elements in the set of feasible actions
or by affecting the consequences of choosing them.” Elster, supra note 96, at 1754 (emphasis
in original). The SE(c)(3) regime falls into the latter category. Which type of commitment
device the nonprofit regime represents depends on whether earning profits or distributing those
profits to owners is viewed as problematic.
120. Over time, a single SE(c)(3) could fill both roles, evolving from a mission-focused
enterprise early in its lifecycle and only later turning to shareholder profitability. In such a
case, the SE(c)(3) exclusion might be thought of as, in part, a form of deferral. Early tax
savings at the corporate level would be offset by higher taxes in later years. Although deferral
is an important element of tax planning, this deferral would not necessarily be valuable enough
to offset the costs of the higher future taxes.
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III. SE(C)(3)
The commitment device detailed in this Part could deliver a subsidy to the social
enterprise sector but need not.121 Certainly, as compared to the sharply limited
charitable deduction afforded to for-profit corporations, the SE(c)(3) exclusion
appears generous.122 Unlike the deduction, the SE(c)(3) regime could allow a
moderately profitable social enterprise to completely shed its income tax burden.123
The operation of the SE(c)(3) regime, however, involves both a carrot and a stick.
The burden it imposes on shareholder profits could ensure that the overall tax burden
on a dual mission enterprise and its shareholders will be comparable to that borne by
a similar non-SE(c)(3) corporation and, no less important, that strategic claimants
will not receive a windfall.124
This Part explores the contours of the SE(c)(3) regime, describing how it supports
mission-focused social enterprises while penalizing greenwashed ventures. Social
enterprise places social mission at the center of a venture rather than at its periphery.125
The SE(c)(3) regime does likewise, identifying and shielding a limited amount of
mission-driven income from tax. While an ordinary for-profit corporation might be
allowed a deduction for incidental charitable activities, the SE(c)(3) regime provides
an exclusion for up to $250,000 of income attributable to an enterprise’s social mission
and an additional one-for-one exclusion for each dollar of SE(c)(3) income.126 Pairing

121. The relationship between the tax penalty and tax expenditure elements will determine
whether the SE(c)(3) regime is the “fair bet” that Abramowicz and Ayres envision with their
compensating commitment bond. Abramowicz & Ayres, supra note 93, at 607–08. Inevitably,
as individual enterprises focus more heavily on mission or profits, their results under the
regime will diverge. The aggregate results for the regime overall would be less random.
122. Individuals can deduct an amount equal to fifty percent of their charitable
contributions for many charities while corporations face a much lower ten percent limit.
Compare I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) (2012) (providing the higher limit for individuals), with I.R.C.
§ 170(b)(2)(A) (2012) (providing the lower limit for corporate donors).
123. The SE(c)(3) exclusion is neither a credit nor a deduction. It instead excludes a portion
of an SE(c)(3)’s income from the tax law’s definition of “income.” Generally, the tax law
provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross income means all income
from whatever source derived . . . .” I.R.C. § 61(a) (2012). Like the exclusion providing for
$500,000 of gain on the sale of a home by a married couple, the SE(c)(3) exclusion would be
such an exception. See I.R.C. § 121 (2012) (providing that “[g]ross income shall not include
gain from the sale or exchange of property if . . . such property has been owned and used by
the taxpayer as the taxpayer’s principal residence for periods aggregating 2 years or more,” up
to $250,000 for individual taxpayers or $500,000 for a married couple).
124. The carrot of the exclusion for mission-driven income will be balanced by the stick
of higher taxes on shareholder financial profits. Strategic claimants with little or no
mission-driven income and significant shareholder profits will feel the brunt of the stick
without the benefit of the carrot.
125. While a for-profit corporation might engage in charitable activity and a charity may
engage in some amount of business, the social mission and the profit are closely linked. For
example, the mission may dictate how the enterprise’s products are manufactured or
distributed. See Brakman Reiser & Dean, supra note 8, at 1499 (“These enterprises
manufacture products using more expensive inputs to reduce their environmental impact, or
give away some of their products to those in need.”).
126. To prevent taxpayers from taking a heads-I-win, tails-you-lose approach by waiting
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that contingent benefit with a relatively high tax on distributions of profit and sales of
shares produces a tax regime uniquely suited to social enterprise.127
A. A Tax Regime for Social Enterprise
Social enterprises fall somewhere on the spectrum between robber-baron
capitalism and the pure selflessness of a charity. Of course, the same might be said
of many nonprofits and the entire Fortune 500.128 What distinguishes social
enterprise is not its rejection of unfettered greed as a guiding principle, but the degree
to which social mission is integrated into a venture’s core. Google would still be
Google without Google.org.129 By contrast, without its one-for-one model to
“transform[] . . . customers into benefactors[,]” TOMS Shoes would be
unrecognizable.130 As described below, the SE(c)(3) regime’s exclusion exploits that
intimate connection between social mission and business methods.
1. For-Profit Charity: UBIT and Charitable Deductions
The tax law accepts that charities may seek profits and that profit-seeking firms may
act charitably. A tax-exempt entity that engages in an “unrelated business” finds itself
subject to tax on any resulting income.131 Conversely, a corporation enjoys a respite
from tax by deducting charitable contributions much as an individual would.132

until a tax return would be due—potentially more than a year after the formation of the
corporation—it would be reasonable to require an up-front declaration as to whether the
exclusion will be claimed. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1362(b)(1) (2012) (requiring S Corporations to
file an election by the middle of the third month of a given year); I.R.C. § 1221(a)(7) (2012)
(requiring a hedging transaction to be “clearly identified as such before the close of the day on
which it was acquired, originated, or entered into . . . .”).
127. As detailed below, the distribution of profits by an SE(c)(3) incurs a higher tax burden
than would apply to a similar distribution by a non-SE(c)(3) corporation. Paired with the
relatively high rates that would apply to each dollar of distributed profit or capital gain, the
SE(c)(3) exclusion’s apparent subsidy becomes something else entirely. By encouraging the
pursuit of social mission while penalizing shareholder profit taking, the SE(c)(3) regime serves
as a commitment device designed to shield an enterprise’s social mission.
128. The ubiquitous museum gift shop offers an illustration of a nonprofit engaging in
commerce. See, e.g., MOMA STORE, http://www.momastore.org/ (the online store associated
with New York’s Museum of Modern Art). The charitable activities of Fortune 500 businesses
receive considerable attention. See, e.g., Ben Gose, Marisa López-Rivera, Emma Carew
Grovum & Sarah Frostenson, With Cash Giving Flat, Big Companies Offer Other Aid, CHRON.
PHILANTHROPY, July 18, 2013, at 1 (describing a wide range of philanthropic efforts by major
for-profit companies).
129. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 83, at 2437–46 (discussing Google.org).
130. General TOMS Questions, TOMS, http://www.toms.com/faq#faq (describing TOMS’
one-for-one model of providing shoes to those in need whenever a pair of its shoes is sold).
131. I.R.C. § 511(a)(1) (2012) (imposing a tax on the “unrelated business taxable income”
of otherwise tax-exempt organizations).
132. I.R.C. § 170 (2012) (providing for a charitable deduction for corporations as well as
individuals).
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In each case, the applicable regime treats the secondary mission as an aberration.
Consistent with that notion, the Unrelated Business Income Tax (UBIT) calves off
commercial activities by tax-exempt entities, subjecting only the “unrelated” income
to tax.133 This approach quarantines commercial activity from a tax-exempt
organization’s primary undertaking, simultaneously preserving the organization’s
preferential treatment and the tax preference itself.134
The charitable deduction obviously does not penalize a corporate contribution. It
does, however, require a for-profit business to give without the expectation of
receiving a benefit in return.135 While not unique to the corporate context, this
requirement obliges a for-profit enterprise to take an action that—in the narrowest
sense—runs contrary to its nature. One might reasonably perceive self-interest at
work in corporate charity, but the tax law demands selflessness. A profit motive
could be fatal to a charitable deduction, even if the underlying action has a big
positive social impact.
The suspect status of corporate charity under the tax law can be seen more vividly
by comparing the treatment corporate and individual contributions receive.136 Even
when a for-profit corporation can demonstrate the requisite altruism, the deduction it
receives in return for its generosity is sharply limited. While a noncorporate donor
may offset as much as half its income through charitable contributions, a corporation
can only deduct an amount equal to one-tenth of its profits.137 Although they are
permitted to make charitable contributions, for-profit corporations are constrained in
their ability to deduct them.
To the extent that a social enterprise treats social mission and investor profit as
interrelated, core objectives, a tax regime that marginalizes one or the other is a
poor fit. Of course, that tension simply echoes the broader challenges of operating
in the poorly charted territory between for-profit and nonprofit.138 Here, as in other

133. I.R.C. § 512(a)(1) (2012) (defining unrelated business taxable income as “the gross
income derived by any organization from any unrelated trade or business . . . regularly carried
on by it, less the deductions allowed by this chapter which are directly connected with the
carrying on of such trade or business . . . .”).
134. See Ethan G. Stone, Adhering to the Old Line: Uncovering the History and Political
Function of the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 54 EMORY L.J. 1475, 1479–80 (2005)
(arguing that although it is traditionally “justified . . . as a measure to protect taxable businesses
from unfair tax-exempt competition and to protect against erosion of the tax base by rapacious
charities buying or crushing taxable businesses . . . the UBIT protects the symbolic meaning
of the [§ 501(c)(3)] exemption, rather than an instrumental policy goal”).
135. See United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 116 (1986) (“A payment of
money generally cannot constitute a charitable contribution if the contributor expects a
substantial benefit in return.”). One of the most famous cases involves an attempt by Singer to
take a deduction in connection with discount sales of sewing machines to schools. The court
rejected Singer’s claimed deduction because it made the discount sales with an expectation of
generating future sales of sewing machines to former students. Singer Co. v. United States,
449 F.2d 413 (Ct. Cl. 1971).
136. See supra note 122.
137. See supra note 122.
138. See, e.g., Brakman Reiser, supra note 74, at 683 (describing social entrepreneurs’
concerns that “traditional for-profit and nonprofit legal forms frustrate social entrepreneurs’
bold new vision for achieving social change”).
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areas, social enterprise’s interstitial nature presents practical obstacles as well as
conceptual incongruities.139
Simply put, social enterprise seems a square peg to the round holes of the
for-profit and nonprofit tax regimes. Although a tax-exempt entity may conduct an
unrelated business of significant size,140 no distributions of profit may ever be made
to investors.141 That nondistribution constraint may make sense for a tax-exempt
organization engaged in a business ancillary to its social mission. It is fundamentally
incompatible with the aim of a double-bottom-line organization to provide financial
rewards to investors in tandem with social good.
Structural constraints imposed on charitable contributions made by for-profit
ventures would similarly frustrate the hybrid nature of a social enterprise, even if
the percentage limitations did not. Although a business may choose which charity
receives its largesse, it does not itself oversee the delivery of the charitable goods
or services.142 To earn a charitable deduction, the for-profit venture must contribute
to a charity or other eligible organization, rather than engaging directly in
charitable activities.143
The animating insight of social enterprise is that business methods have great
power to advance social good. Unfortunately, the tax law simply does not
contemplate direct involvement by for-profit ventures in charitable endeavors. Like
charity law’s nondistribution constraint, the tax law’s insistence on segregating
charitable and profit-seeing activities—here, by hobbling the mission-driven
activities of businesses—makes a true double bottom line impossible.144

139. See Brakman Reiser & Dean, supra note 8, at 1501 (noting that, given the poor fit
between dual-mission enterprises and traditional single-mission business forms, “social
entrepreneurs . . . face real obstacles when they try to secure both access to capital and
protection for social mission”).
140. A tax-exempt organization may earn a large amount of unrelated business income,
but must also “carry[] on . . . a charitable program commensurate in scope with its financial
resources.” Rev. Rul. 64-182, 1964-1 C.B. 186.
141. Hansmann, supra note 18, at 838 (identifying this prohibition on profit distributions
to owners as the “nondistribution constraint”).
142. See I.R.C. § 170(c) (2012) (defining “charitable contribution” as a “gift to or for the
use of” a short list of entities including charitable organizations and governments). As
discussed below, outside of the charitable deduction, corporate altruism is not generally
deductible. See infra notes 152–57 and accompanying text.
143. Although for-profit ventures can claim a deduction for charitable contributions just as any
individual might, charitable activities do not entitle individuals or for-profit ventures to the special
tax benefits open to charities. See Malani & Posner, supra note 2, at 2020 (noting that “for-profit
charities . . . forfeit all the state and federal tax benefits available to nonprofit charities”).
144. The statute governing charitable contributions prevents corporations from shielding
more than a small fraction of its income from tax with charitable deductions. A corporation
may, for example, deduct no more than ten percent of its taxable income in any year. See supra
note 122. While presumably sufficiently generous to accommodate the needs of most
businesses, such a deduction would be wholly inadequate for a social enterprise equally
devoted to profit and mission.
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2. Extraordinary Expenditures
Freeing social enterprises of those constraints is not simply a matter of easing
limitations on corporate charitable contributions145 or curbing the reach of the
UBIT.146 The SE(c)(3) regime represents an approach built from the ground up with
social enterprise in mind. Rather than retrofitting regimes designed to police the
traditional for-profit and nonprofit dichotomy, it offers a solution tailor-made for a
double bottom line.
In a sense, the fact that any business manages to turn a profit is surprising.
Competition and the vagaries of the public’s taste—not to mention Murphy’s
Law—all conspire to make losing money much easier than making it. For a social
enterprise, the task is made all the more difficult by the unorthodox combination
of social good and profits.
Perversely, from a tax perspective, the downward pressure social mission exerts
on a venture’s profitability should constitute a blessing.147 An enterprise that
sufficiently prioritizes a social mission should have little to fear from a tax on
profits.148 Employing an unskilled labor force in order to provide those employees
with valuable job skills imposes clear costs on an enterprise. The more urgently it
pursues the social goal of training its employees, the less likely such a venture is to
earn a profit that might be subject to tax.
Although it may seem improbable, profitability for such a double-bottom-line
enterprise is not impossible. Customers appear willing to pay an altruism premium
for the satisfaction of knowing that by purchasing a good or service, they will provide
a significant benefit to a hard-working employee.149 A sufficiently high premium
could more than offset the negative profit impact of the venture’s social mission. In
such a case, a social enterprise’s economic return—like that of any other venture—
would be subject to the income tax.150
Unlike a for-profit venture, a social enterprise may be systematically taxed on
more than its economic profit. Mission-driven expenditures might not be

145. See supra note 122.
146. See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
147. The income tax is, after all, a tax on net income, rather than gross income. See I.R.C.
§ 63(a) (2012) (specifying that “‘taxable income’ means gross income minus the deductions
allowed” by the Code).
148. In addition to the limits on extraordinary expenditures discussed below, see infra
notes 151–57 and accompanying text, other potential tax problems for a social enterprise with
negative cash flows might be the result of timing or character mismatches. For example, an
expenditure might generate significant current income but be considered a capital expenditure
so that any deductions arising from the expenditure arise largely or entirely in future years.
See I.R.C. § 263(a) (2012) (providing that “no deduction shall be allowed for . . . permanent
improvements or betterments made to increase the value of any property or estate”).
149. See Brakman Reiser & Dean, supra note 8, at 1499–500 (describing a range of dual
mission enterprises premised on the notion that customers will help to subsidize the
enterprise’s social mission).
150. A corporate social enterprise would itself be considered a taxpayer. See I.R.C. § 11(a)
(2012) (“A tax is hereby imposed for each taxable year on the taxable income of every
corporation.”).
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deductible.151 At some point, mission-driven expenditures, such as the costs of extra
training for nontraditional employees or using a costly and unconventional
production process, fall afoul of the requirement that deductible expenses be
“ordinary and necessary.”152 In Welch v. Helvering, a taxpayer paid debts of his
former employer despite the fact that, first, they were not his obligations and, second,
they had been discharged in bankruptcy.153 His motivation—“to reestablish his
relations with customers whom he had known” as an employee of the bankrupt
company “and to solidify his credit and standing”—prevented him from deducting
those payments.154
While commendable, his actions were extraordinary. The Supreme Court
explained that “[u]nless we can say from facts within our knowledge that these are
ordinary and necessary expenses according to the ways of conduct and the forms of
speech prevailing in the business world,” no deduction is permitted.155 Despite Welch
v. Helvering’s holding, resources that social enterprises devote to mission at the
expense of profit—like the thousands of dollars that Welch paid although not legally
required to do so—tend to not only be “well and wisely spent” but also deductible.156
Nevertheless, when its mission-driven expenditures extend far beyond those a typical
business would incur, a social enterprise may find those extraordinary expenses
disallowed on Welch v. Helvering grounds so that it is viewed as profitable through
an income tax lens even if it loses money.157

151. This limitation is one reason that a for-profit corporation might not be able to
“produce[] a tax result nearly as beneficial as a charitable donation” by using a “subsidiary’s
operating losses . . . to offset taxable income from other profitable subsidiaries.” Fleischer,
supra note 3, at 232 (noting that for-profit corporations might be able to deduct the losses of
the mission-driven affiliates). While the subsidiary’s mission-driven expenditures would
reduce economic profits, they might not generate tax losses.
152. I.R.C. §162(a) (2012) (“There shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and
necessary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or
business . . . .”).
153. 290 U.S. 111 (1933).
154. Id. at 112.
155. Id. at 115.
156. Id. at 116. Other courts have allowed similar payments to be deducted. See Dunn
& McCarthy, Inc. v. Comm’r, 139 F.2d 242, 244 (2d Cir. 1943) (allowing a deduction arising
from the satisfaction of a moral obligation “when the directors in good faith and with good
reason authorize the payment for the purpose of preserving the loyalty of employees and the
good will of customers”).
157. Deciding whether that would represent an appropriate burden or might better be
thought of as a departure from the tax law’s generosity towards public-spirited activities lies
beyond the scope of this Article. See generally Leff, supra note 3 (offering a thorough
exploration of the proper treatment of charitable activities of entities other than nonprofits).
One way of understanding the question is considering whether mission-driven income should
be taxed on a net (rather than a gross) basis. Generally, the income tax is imposed on a net
basis. Compare I.R.C. § 63(a) (2012) (specifying that “taxable income” means gross income
less permitted deductions), with I.R.C. § 871 (2012) (imposing a gross thirty percent tax on
certain types of income earned by nonresident individuals), and I.R.C. § 881 (2012) (imposing
a gross thirty percent tax on certain types of income earned by foreign corporations).
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3. The SE(c)(3) Exclusion
The SE(c)(3) regime embraces the notion of a double bottom line by providing an
exclusion for up to $250,000 of income attributable to a social enterprise’s mission.
Each dollar of mission-driven expenditures that an enterprise incurs—money spent
primarily to further its social mission—results in the exclusion of a dollar of
otherwise taxable SE(c)(3) income.158 The additional one-for-one feature doubles the
amount of that exclusion to provide an additional dollar of tax-free income for each
dollar of excluded SE(c)(3) income. As a result, even a moderately profitable social
enterprise would owe no tax so long as its revenues do not exceed its conventional
outlays by more than double its mission-driven expenditures.
Take a corporate social enterprise that spends $25,000 on conventional business
expenses and another $25,000 a year on mission-driven training while earning
$100,000 in revenues.159 The SE(c)(3) exclusion would shield a portion of the
enterprise’s income with its mission-driven expense. The SE(c)(3) need only
demonstrate that the mission-driven expenditures were incurred with a principal
purpose of advancing a charitable or educational purpose that would be consistent
with the tax-exempt activities of a 501(c)(3) entity.160 No deduction would be
allowed for those expenditures, even if they would have satisfied the ordinary and
necessary standard.161
Excluding $25,000 of the enterprise’s income would provide a result broadly
consistent with a deduction—gross income of $75,000 less deductions totaling
$25,000 producing a taxable income of $50,000—by ensuring that the hypothetical
social enterprise described above is taxed on net income.162 The additional

158. The carrot in the regime operates like a limited version of the exemption for
“charitable” income earned by a for-profit enterprise. See Malani & Posner, supra note 2, at
2039 (proposing such an exemption in order to end “tax discrimination against for-profit
firms”). Critics have noted the likelihood that such an approach would create a “flood of
companies that currently pay taxes—for example, biotech and cleantech startups engaged in
‘scientific’ activities or web companies engaged in ‘literary’ activities—attempting to qualify
as charities.” Fleischer, supra note 3, at 232. In the simplest case, the SE(c)(3) regime requires
social enterprises to demonstrate their commitment to mission by incurring mission-driven
expenses. Conditioning the exclusion on the existence and amount of those mission-driven
expenses—particularly when paired with the high rates on sales of SE(c)(3) shares and
distributions of SE(c)(3) profits—serves to exclude strategic claimants. Id.
159. Even if they would otherwise be deductible—by virtue of being deemed ordinary and
necessary—no deduction would be allowed for SE(c)(3) expenses identified as mission driven.
Allowing a single expense to give rise to both an exclusion and a deduction would allow
taxpayers two bites at the proverbial apple.
160. At the risk of understatement, it is not easy to draw a line between those activities that
qualify for 501(c)(3) tax exempt status and those that do not. See Fleischer, supra note 3, at
232 (expressing skepticism regarding the possibility of reliably “distinguishing a charitable
endeavor from any other business” under such circumstances). This makes the limit on the
amount of the exclusion and the threat of higher rates on shareholder capital gains and profit
distributions important to discourage greenwashing.
161. See supra Part III.A.2.
162. The income tax is generally a tax on profits (net income) because taxpayers are
allowed to deduct expenses they incur in generating income. See supra note 147. The SE(c)(3)
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one-for-one exclusion of $25,000 would go further. The social enterprise’s gross
income falls to $50,000, an amount that is again reduced by $25,000, now producing
a taxable income of $25,000.
The basic exclusion amount ensures that mission-driven expenses will not be
treated less favorably than conventional expenses on Welch v. Helvering grounds.
Conceptually, the one-for-one exclusion allows for the possibility of mission-driven
profits, perhaps as the product of an altruism premium. In other words, if
mission-driven expenditures more than pay for themselves, a social enterprise could
shield the resulting income from tax.163 At a more practical level, the enhanced
exclusion provides a safety margin for social enterprises.164
A different sort of social enterprise—for example, one that serves its mission not
by incurring mission-driven expenditures, but by offering mission-focused
discounts—could also fit within the SE(c)(3) regime. If the one-for-one exclusion
were linked to either extraordinary expenses or mission-driven discounts, it could
shield an amount of income equal to the discounts it provides.165
In essence, a social enterprise that manages to be profitable despite the economic
burden associated with its social mission would treat a portion of its income equal to
that burden as excludable SE(c)(3) income. The additional resources a social
enterprise devotes (as compared to a for-profit business) to training its employees,
providing discounted services to customers, or deploying environmentally friendly
production technology166 would serve as a benchmark for that burden.167 Managers
would be offered a clear incentive to promote the enterprise’s mission.168

exclusion would avoid the arguably perverse result of penalizing a social enterprise for not
conforming to for-profit industry standards.
163. Imagine a case in which TOMS spends two dollars on shoes for a needy person but
charges its customers a ten-dollar premium for a comparable for-profit product.
164. The SE(c)(3) exclusion might likewise be leveraged to lighten the administrative
burden on heavily mission-driven social enterprises. A clear showing that its revenues do not
more than double its mission-driven expenses (or, in closer cases, revenues less conventional
expenses) could eliminate the need to file a traditional tax return.
165. In a variation on the illustration offered above, take a corporate social enterprise that
spends $25,000 on conventional business expenses and offers discounts totaling $25,000 per
year to further its mission ($75,000 in revenues rather than the $100,000 it might otherwise
have earned). Here, the enterprise would ordinarily be subject to tax on $50,000 of income.
Such an enterprise would only qualify for a $25,000 one-for-one exclusion (i.e., it would not
be granted both the SE(c)(3) exclusion and the one-for-one exclusion).
166. Mission-driven expenditures of this sort raise important questions of timing.
Ordinarily, major expenditures such as this would be capitalized and recovered over time. See
supra note 148. The SE(c)(3) regime might offer a simplified analog of this approach,
permitting these costs to give rise to SE(c)(3) (plus one-for-one) exclusions over, say, a
ten-year term.
167. In all of these cases, identifying which expenditures (or what portions of which
expenditures) would qualify as mission driven would not always be easy. In most cases,
however, it should not be difficult for a social enterprise to distinguish mission-driven
expenditures. After all, those expenditures are their raison d’être, what distinguishes them
from an ordinary for-profit venture.
168. The creation of a shareholder gross-up provision—providing that the corporation,
rather than the shareholders, will shoulder the loss of capital-gains treatment—would provide
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B. A Commitment to Social Mission
Of course, providing an exclusion for up to $500,000 of income while requiring
only that the enterprise in question demonstrate that it has incurred mission-driven
expenditures would, without more, invite abuse.169 Even defining “mission”
in 501(c)(3) terms, requiring an SE(c)(3) to articulate the charitable, educational, or
scientific goal an expenditure advances would only go so far in screening out
strategic claimants.170 As Victor Fleischer notes, such a tax benefit would unleash “a
flood of companies that currently pay taxes—for example, biotech and cleantech
startups engaged in ‘scientific’ activities or web companies engaged in ‘literary’
activities—attempting to qualify as charities.”171
In the tax-exempt context, the nondistribution constraint serves as a gatekeeper,
discouraging insincere claims of altruism designed to provide access to the generous
and wide-ranging tax preferences available to charities.172 The higher tax rates on
shareholder profits imposed by SE(c)(3) status173—accomplished as a technical
matter by excluding SE(c)(3) stock from the tax law’s definition of “capital asset”
and thereby withholding capital-gain treatment—would serve the same purpose174
with respect to the relatively modest SE(c)(3) exclusion.175 Distributions by an
SE(c)(3) would also be excluded from the definition of “qualified dividend income”
and subject to tax at ordinary rates.176

a further incentive for managers (or at least moderate contrary incentives) to deemphasize
profit in favor of mission. Corporations have sometimes chosen to “gross up” or reimburse
executives for taxes triggered, for example, by inversions, thereby reducing the tax cost of
those transactions for the executives in question. See Liz Hoffman, Corporate Watch, WALL
ST. J., Sept. 2, 2014, at B4 (noting that Medtronic and AbbVie had agreed to pay taxes imposed
on executives as the result of inversion transactions); see also infra note 173.
169. Although some cheating is inevitable, it is difficult to imagine a determined tax cheat
picking the SE(c)(3) regime as her preferred tax-avoidance vehicle (outright fraud does not
require the bells and whistles that would accompany an SE(c)(3) claim).
170. See supra note 160. The more prototypically charitable a social enterprise’s mission,
the more confident it would be in its claim to the exclusion. The opposite is true, of course,
for truly outlandish claims.
171. Fleischer, supra note 3, at 232.
172. See id. at 231–32; Mayer & Ganahl, supra note 3, at 405–08.
173. Although the SE(c)(3) regime’s “penalty” is triggered by distributions of profit or
sales of shares, the financial burden of the penalty need not fall directly on shareholders in
order to be effective. If, for example, an SE(c)(3) agreed to “gross up” shareholders for any
additional taxes, the shareholders would still bear the economic burden of the tax as the firm’s
residual claimants. That would, of course, not be true if only insiders got the benefit of the
gross up. If those insiders exercised sufficient control over the SE(c)(3)’s fate, shifting the
higher taxes imposed by the SE(c)(3) regime to the corporation (i.e., other shareholders) would
undermine the regime’s incentives.
174. As a price of access to an exceptionally broad (and unlimited) tax exemption, the
nondistribution constraint prevents any access to profits by owners or shareholders. The
SE(c)(3) regime imposes a more modest cost in exchange for a more modest benefit.
175. See supra note 17.
176. I.R.C. § 1(h)(11) (2012) improves the treatment of dividends by granting them “net
capital gain” status. I.R.C. § 1(h)(11)(B)(ii)(I) (2012) excludes dividends paid by tax exempt
corporations and would be modified to also exclude SE(c)(3)s.
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A business could, of course, exploit the SE(c)(3) exclusion despite a ruthless focus
on its financial bottom line. Research and development expenses—recast as
scientific research—that might otherwise produce tax benefits in the future could
instead be used to exclude current income.177 The one-for-one exclusion would only
augment the appeal of the regime for for-profit businesses. Such a venture need not
have an interest in pursuing social good as an end in itself.
The SE(c)(3) exclusion on its own might be vulnerable to such strategic claims,
but the SE(c)(3) regime taken as a whole is not. Its design exacts a price for the
SE(c)(3) exclusion that, while palatable for a venture pursing a double bottom line,
could be steep for a strategic claimant. Simply put, for a purely profit-seeking firm,
the cost of the relatively high rates imposed on distributions of SE(c)(3) profits and
sales of SE(c)(3) shares would more than outweigh the advantages of the limited
SE(c)(3) exclusion. Even a business with no shortage of plausibly mission-driven
expenditures would be reluctant to assert a questionable claim to a limited $500,000
entity-level exclusion if the certain result would be an uncapped, permanent increase
in shareholder-level taxes.
There are other, less obvious costs to SE(c)(3) status. Foreign investors in
SE(c)(3)s would find what would otherwise have been tax-free capital gains
transformed into taxable income.178 To claim the SE(c)(3) exclusion, a social
enterprise must operate in corporate form.179 In its startup phase—precisely when the
enhanced funding access provided by SE(c)(3) status would be most important—
embracing the corporate form would represent a lost opportunity for a strategic
claimant. Fledgling businesses often lose money, generating valuable tax losses that
would sit idle in a corporate shell but could shelter unrelated income from tax if the
startup were unincorporated. It would be imprudent of an entrepreneur to precipitate
such costs merely to enable him to assert a marginal claim to an SE(c)(3) exclusion.
C. The Limits of Commitment
In the crowdfunding context, in which promises would be easy for insiders to
make and impossible for small, dispersed investors to verify, a robust collective
signal of commitment to a double bottom line is invaluable.180 The SE(c)(3) regime
serves as a commitment device capable of delivering precisely such a signal.181 The
regime would, of course, serve a useful role outside of the crowdfunding context by
limiting the impact of the complex assurance game confronted by every social

177. The research and development tax credit might, of course, provide a current tax
benefit in these circumstances. See I.R.C. § 41 (2012) (providing a credit for “qualified
research expenses”).
178. See I.R.C. § 871(a) (2012) (exempting capital gains—but not ordinary income—of
nonresident alien investors from U.S. taxation).
179. That might mean an actual corporation. It could also mean another entity, perhaps an
LLC or partnership, electing to receive corporate treatment.
180. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
181. The regime combines a carrot only appealing to mission-driven ventures, see supra
note 158 and accompanying text, with a stick that only hurts shareholders that derive
significant financial gains from a purported social enterprise, see supra note 124 and
accompanying text.
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enterprise. For the mom-and-pop investors182 occupying the crowdfunding space,
that signal would make SE(c)(3) status an indispensable trusted brand.183
Investors always face a principal-agent problem when they place their capital in
the hands of managers with the opportunity to shirk, squander, or steal. This problem
imposes agency costs on investors who try to limit agents’ misdeeds through
monitoring, attempt to realign the incentives of principals and agents to coincide, or
must make an untimely or unprofitable exit. The SE(c)(3) regime complicates the
principal-agent story of a traditional, purely for-profit firm. Indeed, the SE(c)(3) is
designed to decrease the cost of monitoring—particularly monitoring compliance
with a social mission far more difficult to track than profit alone—and to align the
incentives of agents and principals by allowing them to preselect for commitment to
a double bottom line. On the other hand, its reduction of the after-tax value of profits
investors take out of the firm could increase managers’ existing temptation to retain
earnings184 and magnify the cost of investor exit. One cannot be certain how this
trade-off will turn out but in our view, SE(c)(3)’s focused protection for social
mission is worth the risk, particularly in the typically small, illiquid social enterprise,
whose investors’ ability to sell is already limited. After all, we are only contemplating
a commitment device, and in turn a signal, to enable the creation of a primary market
for small-scale social enterprise investments. The possibility of a secondary market
is even more remote.
Of course, the SE(c)(3) regime’s success as a commitment device also depends
on the participation of the federal government. The executive branch, specifically
the Internal Revenue Service, would be called on to play the role of “judge” by
rewarding compliance and penalizing defection.185 Fortunately, although the IRS’s

182. The SE(c)(3) regime is designed with nonaccredited crowdfund investors in mind; but
its signaling value could also make it useful to accredited investors already being sought out
by platforms designed for them. For example, CircleUp markets itself as a crowdfunding
platform offering accredited investors access to invest in a range of small companies. See
Getting Started, CIRCLEUP, https://circleup.com/getting-started/. With the JOBS Act’s lifting
of the ban on general solicitation of accredited investors, efforts like these are likely to rise.
JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, § 201(a)(1), 126 Stat. 306, 313–14 (2012).
Additionally, while SE(c)(3) is targeted at domestic individual investors, nothing would
prevent foreign investors from purchasing SE(c)(3) shares or a big public corporation from
forming an SE(c)(3) as a subsidiary. Since corporations do not enjoy a rate preference for
capital gains, the stick employed by the SE(c)(3) regime would not affect them directly.
Subjecting sales of the stock of “affiliated” corporations to ordinary rates would subject the
ultimate shareholders of those corporate owners to the higher rates on all of their stock—not
just a relatively small portion related to the SE(c)(3) subsidiary. See infra note 194. Foreign
investors would find gains that might otherwise entirely escape U.S. taxation being heavily
taxed, a bigger penalty than the rate differential faced by domestic sellers of SE(c)(3) shares.
183. Although not explicitly excluded from investing in SE(c)(3)s, existing corporate
groups would face a steep potential cost from an investment in an SE(c)(3). If their ownership
stake exceeded specific thresholds, they might themselves become an SE(c)(3), imposing a
higher tax burden on their ultimate owners. See infra note 194.
184. See generally Steven A. Bank, A Capital Lock-In Theory of the Corporate Income
Tax, 94 GEO. L. J. 889 (2006) (describing how corporate forms tend to lock in capital, a feature
that explains entity-level corporate taxation).
185. Although its interpretations and actions are subject to judicial review, the Internal
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powers are limited, the SE(c)(3) regime does not require tax authorities to stray
beyond their comfort zone.186
Unless an SE(c)(3) distributes profits to shareholders or those shareholders sell
their shares, tax authorities cannot penalize an enterprise that abandons its social
mission to pursue profits. If a decision short of profit distribution or sale drives a
social enterprise to forsake its mission, the Internal Revenue Service as judge would
be powerless to preserve that mission.187 But a sell-out is what insiders and outsiders
alike fear most.188
Since the SE(c)(3) regime targets only distributions of profits by SE(c)(3)s and
sales of SE(c)(3) shares, routine tax-planning techniques could substitute
economically equivalent transactions designed to skirt the edges of the regime.
Fortunately, the corporate tax has long experience defeating such efforts.189 As
elsewhere, those responses could impose broad limitations on the structure and
operations of SE(c)(3)s190 or narrowly target specific abuses.191
For example, the owner of an SE(c)(3) might contribute its shares to a holding
company in order to sell shares of its new parent free of the SE(c)(3) taint.192 The owner
might instead strip away the SE(c)(3)’s corporate shell and replace it with an ordinary
corporation.193 Alternatively, the SE(c)(3) might purchase shares of a sibling
corporation from their shared owner, resulting in (1) a meaningless reshuffling of
corporate ownership and (2) the receipt of cash by the SE(c)(3)’s owner from the
SE(c)(3) without any distribution or sale of SE(c)(3) shares taking place.

Revenue Service possesses ample “actual authority” over the tax law. See supra note 105.
186. See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
187. In other words, the SE(c)(3) regime would “protect investors and entrepreneurs from
opportunistic sales by their counterparty . . . [rather than] bind either side during the ordinary
course of the firm’s dealings.” See Brian Galle, Social Enterprise: Who Needs It?, 54 B.C. L.
REV. 2025, 2026 (2013) (noting the same limitation in a prior proposal).
188. That fear is perhaps best illustrated by the well-known, but dubious, story of the sale
of Ben & Jerry’s to Unliver. See supra note 70. Taken as a cautionary tale of the risks of going
public for mission-driven enterprises—thereby inviting outside investors into the proverbial
boardroom—that sale illustrates how the SE(c)(3) regime might operate to dissuade insiders
as well as outsiders from seeking to cash in. Had Ben & Jerry’s been an SE(c)(3), the insiders
would have been subject to the regime’s relatively high rates on their sale, making the sale to
Unilever less profitable (and presumably less appealing).
189. See, e.g., supra note 108 and accompanying text.
190. The regime for S corporations provides favorable treatment of corporations owned by
a relatively small group of individuals. See I.R.C. § 1363(a) (2012) (providing that “an
S corporation shall not be subject to . . . tax[]”). To ensure that the regime is not abused, an
S corporation may only have “one class of stock.” See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D) (2012). The
regime also forbids, with limited exceptions, an S corporation from having owners that are not
individuals. See I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(B) (2012). Those broad limitations foreclose a host of
planning opportunities, some troubling and some not.
191. See infra notes 194–96.
192. The formation of the holding company would ordinarily be tax free under I.R.C. § 351
(2012), which is designed to promote corporate formation.
193. Such a liquidation and reincorporation might not trigger much tax if it were carried
out while the enterprise remained focused on pursuing a double bottom line.
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None of those strategies would pose any particular challenge for the SE(c)(3)
regime. Extending the election to closely related corporations would defeat the
first.194 The second represents precisely the sort of liquidation-reincorporation
technique once used to purge corporations of unwanted characteristics and long since
addressed by an affirmative use of tax-free reorganization provisions.195 The third
technique likewise invokes a response from a longstanding anti-abuse statute,
recharacterizing the purchase as a distribution paid by the SE(c)(3) to its owner. 196
IV. CATALYZING SOCIAL ENTERPRISE CROWDFUNDING
Government has been more of a hindrance than a help to the maturation of the
social enterprise sector. The traditional dichotomy of for-profit and nonprofit has
produced tax and corporate laws that cater to the extremes, while creating obstacles
for entrepreneurs and investors working at the intersection of profit and social
mission. The SE(c)(3) regime described here offers a regulatory structure designed
to remedy that failure.
Of course, other paths are open to policymakers. The state law that governs both
for-profit and nonprofit enterprises could be amended to address the needs of
dual-mission ventures. By failing to strike a balance between securing a venture’s
mission and preserving shareholder autonomy, the hybrid entities that have
proliferated in the United States over the past few years have fallen short.197 However
frustrating, those failures—compounded by the reluctance to retrofit the tax law to
address the needs of social enterprises—should not be taken as proof that
policymakers are powerless to support the efforts of double-bottom-line enterprises.
Legislators committed to crafting specialized organizational forms to attract
capital to social enterprises need to do two things: (1) provide a clear standard
requiring adopting entities to prioritize social good and (2) develop meaningful

194. The parent might, for example, be treated as part of an SE(c)(3) “affiliated group” so
its stock would also be excluded from § 1221. See I.R.C. § 1504(a) (2012) (defining an
“affiliated group” as a group of corporations connected by a chain of ownership). The rules
for a “controlled group” of a corporation might also by invoked to ensure that taxpayers are
not unfairly getting more than one bite at this proverbial apple. See, e.g., I.R.C. 179(d)(6)(A)
(2012) (invoking § 1563 controlled-group rules to limit the availability of favorable
expense-recovery rules by requiring that “all component members of a controlled group shall
be treated as one taxpayer”). While it might make sense to apply the $500,000 cap to a
controlled group of corporations to prevent double dipping, treating each member of a
controlled group as an SE(c)(3) if any one of them is an SE(c)(3) might be overkill. One could
imagine an entrepreneur owning both an SE(c)(3) and a traditional for-profit corporation. As
long as the corporations transacted at arm’s length (or not at all), having a common owner
should not, on its own, be a problem.
195. See I.R.C. § 368(a)(1)(D) (2012) (providing that such a nondivisive reorganization
will cause the new corporation to be treated as an alter ego of the old).
196. See I.R.C. § 304(a)(1) (2012) (providing that if one corporation acquired stock in another
commonly controlled corporation from their shared owner, the purchase price of that stock “shall
be treated as a distribution in redemption of the stock of the corporation acquiring such stock”).
197. See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text. It is not impossible that the SE(c)(3)
regime could prove a complement to the existing menu of hybrid corporate forms, securing
each enterprise’s mission more firmly than the hybrid forms can on their own.
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enforcement mechanisms.198 With only a couple of exceptions, the current mass of
hybrid forms available in the United States do not require adopting entities to
prioritize social good over profit.199 Instead, they merely require adopting entities to
“do both.”200 Perhaps over time courts will interpret fiduciary obligations in the context
of these specialized forms to impose a social-good-prioritization standard,201 but it is
doubtful they will do so consistently or soon. Legislatures must impose such a standard
to reassure entrepreneurs and investors of the commitment of their counterparts.
This can be done. In 2004, the United Kingdom introduced the community interest
company (CIC), a new incorporated form to house social enterprises.202 The CIC
imposes a commitment to social good over profit, requiring adopting entities to pursue
“community benefit.”203 This command is backed up by an asset lock, which allows
distributions to shareholders only at capped levels and permits assets to be transferred
on dissolution only to other CICs or charitable entities.204 The Belgian Société à
Finalité Sociale (SFS) form requires a statement in the charter limiting the company’s
profit goals and imposes a similar asset lock and caps on returns to investors.205 As was
noted earlier, a pair of outlier statutes do impose social-good prioritization. New York’s
2012 benefit corporation statute states that “[t]he purpose to create general public
benefit shall be a limitation on the other purposes of the benefit corporation, and shall
control over any inconsistent purpose of the benefit corporation.”206 Minnesota’s
statute instructs directors that they “may not give regular, presumptive, or permanent
priority to: . . . the pecuniary interests of the shareholders . . . .”207 Perhaps more states
will follow these examples and adopt social-good prioritization in new
enabling-legislation adoptions or amendments to existing laws.208
Social-good prioritization is vital not only for specialized forms to be
meaningfully distinct but also as a necessary predicate to effective enforcement. The

198. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 74, at 692.
199. See id. at 695.
200. See id. at 694–96.
201. See id. at 696–98.
202. The Companies (Audit, Investigations and Community Enterprise) Act, 2004, c. 27,
§ 26(1) (U.K.) (“There is to be a new type of company to be known as the community
interest company.”)
203. See Community Interest Companies: Guidance Chapters, GOV.UK, https://www.gov.uk
/government/publications/community-interest-companies-how-to-form-a-cic (follow “Chapter 1:
introduction” to pages 6–7, describing the community benefit requirement).
204. See id. (follow “Chapter 6: the asset lock” to pages 4–6).
205. See Matthew F. Doeringer, Fostering Social Enterprise: A Historical and
International Analysis, 20 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 291, 309 (2010) (explaining the elements
of SFS status); see also Jacques Defourny & Marthe Nyssens, Social Enterprise in Europe:
Recent Trends and Developments, 4 SOC. ENTERPRISE J. 202, 207 (2008) (describing the SFS
and various other European cooperative and other social enterprise models).
206. N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 1706(a) (McKinney Supp. 2014). Compare id., with N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 14A:18-5(a) (West Supp. 2014) (“This purpose is in addition to, and may be a
limitation on, its purpose under its certificate of incorporation and any specific purpose set
forth in its certificate of incorporation.”).
207. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 304A.201(1)(2)(i) (West 2015).
208. See State by State Legislative Status, BENEFIT CORP INFO. CENTER,
http://www.benefitcorp.net/state-by-state-legislative-status.
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goal of “doing both” sets up an insurmountable enforcement challenge. How can
investors police an entrepreneur they view as pursuing too little social mission? How
can entrepreneurs defend against investors who decide to pursue more profit? Only
if adopting a specialized form means a social enterprise has signed on to be
meaningfully different than both a nonprofit—by contemplating profit distribution
to investors—and a for-profit—by prioritizing social good over profit, on balance—
can enforcement even be contemplated.
Unfortunately, enforcement, the second of the two challenges faced by a state
government intent on promoting social enterprise, appears the more daunting one. Like
other business forms, current specialized forms enforce standards of conduct on
managers and fiduciaries through private, internal policing. They empower investors
with a range of informational, voting, and litigation rights.209 These investors—alone or
in addition to other interested constituencies like employees, customers, and
beneficiaries—could likewise be drafted to enforce the obligation to pursue social good.
Each of these groups, though, may be rationally apathetic.210 Whether their commitment
to the social enterprise ethic will prove strong enough to overcome this apathy will
depend on the costs of enforcement and the impact of coordination problems.
Imagine an investor in a social enterprise adopting a specialized form; imagine
further that the investor believes the enterprise’s managers are failing to prioritize
social good by changing from local, environmentally sensitive production to less
costly but highly polluting production overseas. Most specialized forms provide for
significant reporting to investors, so our investor may well be aware of this decision.
But what can she do about it? If she is a large shareholder in a small social enterprise,
perhaps she can vote to remove the current fiduciaries and push through a change in
policy. The corporate franchise, however, is of little help to a small investor
incapable of coordinating a response with even like-minded fellows among the
crowd. If enabling legislation adopted a social-good-prioritization standard for
fiduciaries of adopting entities, she might sue for enforcement. Or, she might not.
Litigation over fiduciary compliance is an expensive proposition with
unpredictable outcomes. Even a large investor may prefer to cut her losses and find
a new enterprise in which to invest her money to avoid spending her time and money
on litigation. At the moment, no specialized-form legislation empowers employees,
customers, beneficiaries, or other constituencies to sue fiduciaries. In fact, many
expressly state that only investors have standing.211 Even if new legislation
empowered these groups, the expense of litigation and the difficulties of coordination
would frustrate their ability to effectively enforce social-good prioritization. For
private enforcement within social enterprises to be viable, specialized forms must

209. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 74, at 706–16.
210. See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS 485 (2002)
(explaining that under the rational apathy theory, “[f]or the average shareholder, the necessary
investment of time and effort in making informed voting decisions simply is not worthwhile”).
211. See, e.g., 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 40/4.01(d) (West Supp. 2014) (“A director does
not have a duty to a person that is a beneficiary of the general public benefit purpose or a
specific public benefit purpose of a benefit corporation arising from the status of the person as
a beneficiary.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156E, § 10(e) (2013) (“A director shall not have
a fiduciary duty to a person that is a beneficiary of the general or specific public benefit
purposes of a benefit corporation arising from the status of the person as a beneficiary.”).
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offer accessible methods of effective enforcement. Thus far, enabling legislation has
failed to provide them.
Alternatively, legislation imposing a social good prioritization standard could
empower government agencies to enforce it. The United Kingdom took just this
approach. The CIC legislation created a dedicated, albeit not “heavy-handed,”
regulator212 to monitor CIC compliance with the community-benefit standard and
asset lock, and to set dividend-cap levels.213 No U.S. jurisdiction adopting a
specialized form has empowered a dedicated regulator, and only one state, Illinois,
has indicated it will take any regulatory role.214 The strapped condition of state
budgets will likely doom the Illinois position to remain an outlier. Attorneys general
tasked with enforcing the obligations of charities are massively underfunded for their
current tasks,215 and state revenues across the country are in crisis. While politicians
in the United Kingdom might not think twice about creating a specialized regulatory
apparatus for social enterprise, state legislators here will be wary of even adding to
the portfolio of existing regulators.
Enabling private regulation, however, is much more in sync with the current
political winds. State legislatures might see fit to deputize private organizations to
engage in enforcing social good prioritization. In fact, such enabling legislation
already relies on private bodies to establish standards that adopting entities must then
apply to themselves and claim they meet in order to adopt a specialized form.216
Legislatures could take these efforts a step further and create or incentivize a
private-certification requirement to adopt a specialized form.217 Sadly, this solution
is not the free and easy remedy to the enforcement conundrum that it might seem.
For a certification system to be reliable, someone—in this case, presumably the state
relying upon it—must find and expend resources monitoring the certifying entities.218

212. See Community Interest Companies: Guidance Chapters, supra note 203 (follow
“Chapter 6: the asset lock” to page 3).
213. The initial dividend caps were imposed under the 2005 CIC Regulations. See The
Community Interest Company Regulations, 2005, S.I. 1788 (U.K.), available at
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2005/1788/contents/made. They have been changed over
time, most recently in December 2013. See DEP’T FOR BUS. INNOVATION & SKILLS, CHANGES
TO THE DIVIDEND AND INTEREST CAPS FOR COMMUNITY INTEREST COMPANIES: RESPONSE TO
THE CIC CONSULTATION ON THE DIVIDEND AND INTEREST CAPS (2013), available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/264664/CIC
-13-1333-community-interest-companies-response-on-the-cic-consultation.pdf (announcing
the results of a consultation and of changes to the cap on performance-related dividends).
214. The Illinois L3C statute subjects L3Cs and their “chief operating officer[s],
director[s], or manager[s]” qualifying as “trustee[s]” to the Attorney General’s registration and
reporting requirements. 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 180/1-26(d) (West 2010); see also 760
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/5, 6, 7 (West 2007). See Dana Brakman Reiser, Regulating Social
Enterprises, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L. REV. 231, 235–36 (2014).
215. See Thomas Lee Hazen & Lisa Love Hazen, Duties of Nonprofit Corporate
Directors—Emphasizing Oversight Responsibilities, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1845, 1879 n.163 (2012)
(cataloguing scholarship on the topic).
216. See Brakman Reiser, supra note 74, at 725–28.
217. See id. at 728–32.
218. See id. at 731–32.
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Much work remains to be done for specialized-form legislation to offer the real
assurances that investors and entrepreneurs need to open up capital access for social
enterprise. Thankfully, crafting a prosocial enterprise policy for the United States
does not depend upon eradicating rational apathy and collective-action problems,
reviving state economic prosperity nationwide, or changing the deeply antiregulatory
bias of American political culture. The SE(c)(3) regime offers a simple,
revenue-neutral, and uniquely American approach to the matter. Its use of tax rules
to further goals far afield from measuring or redistributing income would certainly
raise eyebrows in jurisdictions accustomed to relying on direct regulation to achieve
social objectives.219 Here, though, reliance on the tax system for ends that might be
served by direct government action has become commonplace.220
Although it will never warm the hearts of tax purists or tax phobics, the use of the
tax law to catalyze social enterprise crowdfunding has much to recommend it.
Perhaps most importantly, its twin focus on mission-driven expenditures and
shareholder profits capitalizes on the tax law’s strength in measuring net income.221
Rather than attempting to develop a taxonomy of mission-driven activities or to
monitor their implementation, the SE(c)(3) regime measures cash flows.
A cynic might also note that tax breaks tend to fare better in the political process
than economically equivalent government spending.222 That result may be neither
logical nor desirable, but for whatever combination of reasons “[t]ax expenditures
have grown in importance to the point where they are now the dominant instruments
for implementing new discretionary spending policies.”223 While the tax law need
not be the only mechanism through which government promotes the pursuit of
double bottom lines, its use as a mechanism for promoting social and economic
objectives would hardly be unique.
A further argument in favor of using the tax system to deliver this particular
benefit boils down to flexibility. The combination of the tax penalty on shareholder
profits with the tax benefit for mission-driven expenses could be calibrated to achieve
a rough revenue neutrality. That would mean that the heavier burden imposed on

219. Even in the United States, where the use of tax expenditures is commonplace, critics
have long complained that tax laws should not be used as vehicles for government spending.
See SURREY, supra note 109, at 6 (lamenting the implications of the “injection of extraneous,
costly, and ill-considered expenditure programs” into the tax law).
220. See Edward D. Kleinbard, The Congress Within the Congress: How Tax Expenditures
Distort Our Budget and Our Political Processes, 36 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1, 17 (2010) (“The
United States appears . . . to be among the leaders in the proportion of benefits delivered
through the tax system. And, very interestingly, the United States appears to be an outlier in
its extensive use of tax subsidies for business and capital investments . . . .”).
221. See David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending
Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955, 1009 (2004) (“The tax system . . . specializes in income
measurement and has invested billions of dollars in this expertise, including in computer
systems that can match income reports and in agents trained to ferret out fraud.”).
222. See Edward A. Zelinsky, Do Tax Expenditures Create Framing Effects? Volunteer
Firefighters, Property Tax Exemptions, and the Paradox of Tax Expenditure Analysis, 24 VA.
TAX REV. 797, 799 (2005) (noting that because of psychological phenomena, “policies
unacceptable when framed as direct expenditures become supportable when labeled as tax
subsidies, even though the economic substance of the policies is the same”).
223. Kleinbard, supra note 220, at 3.
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SE(c)(3)s emphasizing shareholder profit would indirectly ease the load on
mission-focused enterprises, leaving a light footprint on the federal budget.224
Crafting a more generous exclusion or a more narrowly targeted penalty would make
SE(c)(3) status more attractive for ventures but more expensive for taxpayers.
Either approach would allow government to support the growth of social enterprise
without attempting to seize control of it. Rather than elevating a particular constituency
or a specific approach, the SE(c)(3) regime invites social enterprises to choose for
themselves. In fact, by offering a readily recognizable signal that small investors can
use to identify enterprises committed to balancing social mission and profit, the
SE(c)(3) regime cedes decision-making authority to the wisdom of the crowd.
CONCLUSION
Social enterprise and crowdfunding strain the conventional boundaries of
corporate and tax laws. The SE(c)(3) regime offers a fittingly radical architecture to
house those double-bottom-line ventures, permitting them to embrace and advertise
their dual pursuits of profits and social good. A measured tax benefit linked to the
costs of its mission paired with higher taxes when its shareholders cash in offers an
appropriate balance of rewards and sanctions to ensure fidelity.

224. One could imagine a world in which enterprises would choose the SE(c)(3) regime
not to claim the exclusion, but merely as a means of committing to dedicate a share of their
profits with mission-focused social enterprises. That would obviously require a commitment
on the part of the federal government not to treat the SE(c)(3) regime’s tax penalty like just
another revenue stream (a surplus could be used to expand the exclusion, for example). It
would also require real generosity on the part of an SE(c)(3) having little expectation of
benefitting from the exclusion.

